

From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation¹

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Introduction

Between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 1870s the debate over the political emancipation of the European Jews was known as the “Jewish question”. Particularly in France and Germany, this debate (la *Question Juive* in the former and *Die Judenfrage* in the latter) presented similar arguments.² In both countries the Jews were addressed as an alien group, and as such the main problem they presented to the consolidation of the rising liberal nation-states was that they were an alleged “nation within the nation.” Their political emancipation thus demanded both their *de*-nationalisation, namely, that “they be citizens individually,”³ and their “civic betterment,” that is, a “process of remoulding Jewry with a view to bringing about their assimilation to the society and culture” of the majority of the (Christian) population.⁴ In the German context, one of the most significant discussions concerning this matter was that between Bruno Bauer, the then famous historian of religion also known as the “Robespierre of Theology,”⁵ and a twenty-five year old Karl Marx. Both belonged to the left wing of Hegelianism, and yet their views on the Jewish Question could not have been further apart. On the one hand, Bauer assumed a radical secularist position, which contested Jews’ political emancipation on the ground of their religiosity and demanded that they embrace atheism. On the other hand, Marx questioned the very premises of a discussion that took religion to be an obstacle to political emancipation, and called it a false dilemma.

Nowadays a “Muslim Question” has emerged, namely, the contours of a debate according to which Muslims, now rather than Jews, are criticized for allegedly behaving as a separate body within Western nations and discriminated against on this ground.⁶ As a consequence, their “cultural,” if not political emancipation is framed as the reward for those who undergo a process of acceptance and internalisation of Western values. In this respect, the French case is especially emblematic. Particularly in France the issue of emancipation is framed as a problem of religious identification, as the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols from public schools testifies. As the argument goes, particularly in the case of Muslims, it is their alleged backwardness, their reluctance to accept secularism and to

dismiss religion in the public sphere that obstructs both their participation in the polity and their embracing of its secular ethos (*laïcité*).

This article argues that in locating the limits of Muslim integration in religion and in indicating that such integration requires the dismissal of religion and the embracing of secularism, the French 2004 law and attached discussion about Muslims’ integration is extraordinarily reminiscent of Bruno Bauer’s position on the Jewish Question. In other words, I contend that the now official French approach towards religious neutrality in the public sphere (which explicitly targets Muslims) as the *sine qua non* condition for emancipation, presents some of the key arguments that were prominent during the debate on the Jewish Question in nineteenth century Germany. This is not to suggest a derivation of the present general debate on Muslim integration from the past debate on Jewish integration. Nor is it to assert any sort of direct influence of Bauer’s arguments, upon current advocates of the French secularist agenda.⁷ Moreover, it is not to suggest that a version of the Muslim Question occurs exclusively in France. On the contrary, as several recent publications demonstrate, discrimination and even “casting out” of Muslim populations in the name of the Enlightenment tradition is occurring in all Western countries – a phenomenon largely exacerbated, albeit not originating in, the events of September 11.⁸ In Fekete’s words, anti-Islam sentiments have been exacerbated “by recourse to the Enlightenment as the foundation of western European culture, which therefore needs to be defended. Non-western immigrants must cast off their ‘backward culture’ and assimilate into the modern, secular values of the Enlightenment.”⁹

Given these premises, what I would like to suggest instead is that the discussion of Muslim integration that takes place in France is the one that most clearly epitomizes the paradoxes of secularism and emancipation that were prominent in Bauer’s influential position in the German context with regard to the Jewish Question. In particular, I seek to demonstrate that beneath the discursive formations pertaining to the quest for Jewish integration and now of Muslim integration into the universalist republican state, there lies a common philosophical and political underpinning. The latter is

a combination of (a) a “republican rigorist” position that inconsistently posits emancipation as a universal precept to be realized within the framework of political citizenship while requiring that subjective emancipation be achieved before or independently of such coordinates; and (b) “culturalist differentialism,” which essentializes and establishes an insurmountable difference between cultures thereby effectively operating like biological racism. In other words, both in the case of Bauer’s discussion of the Jewish Question and in the approach of the French state to the Muslim Question, republican rigorism presents the antinomy of establishing emancipation as a goal that ‘individuals’ should achieve while requiring them to be emancipated from the outset; culturalist differentialism, on the other hand, specifies along the fault lines of culture who these ‘individuals’ are. The combination of republican rigorism and cultural differentialism is at the origin of two further antinomies marking the notion of emancipation that is framed by the secular fundamentalism of the French republican project. I call them the antinomy of “emancipation as an end without means” and the antinomy of “emancipation as an end pursued by means of its negation”, namely enforcement. This antinomical structure carries crucial implications for the meaning of emancipation itself, something that Marx had identified in his rebuttal of Bauer’s arguments in *On the Jewish Question*. Ultimately, by showing the striking similarities between the coordinates of the past Jewish Question debate in Germany and the present Muslim Question debate in France, and especially by highlighting the antinomies generated in both cases, this article accomplishes three goals. First, by looking at the French debate on the banning of conspicuous religious symbols from public schools through the lens offered by the Marx-Bauer quarrel on the Jewish Question, it proposes an entirely new and hitherto unexplored view-angle to the paradoxes of European Enlightenment in general and of French secularism in particular. Second, by showing how a common philosophical and political underpinning lies underneath both the Jewish Question and the Muslim Question, it provides tools for deepening current debates on the common roots of antisemitism and Islamophobia, which have begun to attract increasing scholarly attention.¹⁰ Third, by adopting Marx’s line of critique against Bauer’s secularist anti-Jews position in addressing the French law on conspicuous religious symbols, it explores the possibilities of an anti-racist perspective that incorporates a non-reductionist Marxist political-economic framework.

Framing the Jewish Question in the 1840s

The quarrel between Bruno Bauer and the young Karl Marx took place in the context of the debate elicited

by the retrogressive proposals of Friedrich Wilhelm IV concerning the status of the Jews in Prussia. While the Edict of March 11, 1812 declared the Jews Prussian citizens, the 1841 draft law of Friedrich Wilhelm IV proposed to re-establish special corporations for Jews, to remove their right to vote and to substitute their acquired citizenship rights with corporatist rights. The new anti-Jewish campaign triggered great opposition and was eventually abandoned in 1847.¹¹ But whatever the different positions on the table, within the coordinates of this debate, assimilation was regarded by most as the condition for full integration. Figures such as Fichte, Kant, Savigny and Herder, for instance, regarded Judaism as a threat to the state and the Jews as fundamentally un-assimilable.¹² Judaism was the anti-universal religion, a sectarian belief, and the Jews a foreign people (*ein fremdes Volk*), who did not accept secular authority and threatened it by subjecting itself to an alternative law.¹³ What is worth noticing here is that the debate on the citizenship of the Jews was conducted mainly in ‘cultural-national’ and ‘religious’ terms, not yet in the biologically racist terms that would become commonplace by the end of the nineteenth century. That is, the main accusation addressed the ‘alien’ (*Fremd*) character of the Jews, as a separate body within the Christian Prussian state. However, to be an alien was still conceived in religious and cultural terms. For Fries and Savigny, for instance, Jews were community aliens or alien people, not ‘blood aliens,’ as the Nazis would call them later.¹⁴ It was Jew hatred and not yet Antisemitism.¹⁵

Republican Rigorism and Culturalist Differentialism in Bruno Bauer

In the immediate aftermath of the 1841 law proposal on the political rights of the Jews, the Hegelian philosopher Bruno Bauer published two articles: “The Jewish Question” (*Die Judenfrage*, 1843) and “The capacity of contemporary Jews and Christians to become free” (*Die Faehigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu werden*, 1843). Marx critically reviewed both in his more famous essay “On the Jewish Question” (*Zur Judenfrage* 1844). By intervening in the debate triggered by Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Bauer aimed to address the pressing question of citizenship rights for Jews and to subject to critical scrutiny a demand for political emancipation that was addressed to a Christian State by a non-Christian subject. Are the Jews ready for political emancipation? Can they demand such emancipation from the Christian State? How can one religion emancipate another religion? Can religion, any religion, be the medium for political and human emancipation?

These are the questions that Bauer asked throughout the two essays. To answer them, his main argument revolved around the idea that Jews would not be able

either to receive or to guarantee political emancipation, or full juridical equality, if they remained Jews. At the same time a State that privileged, and was based upon, another religion, i.e., Christianity, by definition could not emancipate the Jews. By framing the problem in this way, Bauer, on the one hand, re-proposed one of the widespread anti-Jewish leitmotifs according to which Jews behaved as a separate body and, therefore, were inherently unable to cooperate within a non-Jewish State and to co-exist with other 'peoples.' For Bauer in general, religion was the obstacle to human emancipation. The eradication of religion from political life, thus, was for him the *sine qua non* of both political and human emancipation. Nevertheless, Bauer did not conceive of all religions as equal and thus did not see them as equal obstacles to emancipation. The fundamental problem with the Jews for him was not simply their allegedly self-attributed status of the 'chosen people.' More than this, Bauer criticized the Jews for allegedly 'resisting' assimilation to the totality of the German *Volksgeist*. Jewish refusal to assimilate, according to him, showed not only a lack of historical perspective, but also their refusal to acknowledge a process that Bauer claimed to have already occurred. He maintained that the Jewish religion had already undergone a process of sublation (*Aufhebung*) that it failed to accept: first, into Christianity and second, into the anti-religious religion of humanity itself, namely the Enlightenment. As Bauer argues, "the Christian religion constitutes the sublation (*Aufhebung*) of Judaism, and therefore also the sublation of the latter's exclusiveness. But it also constitutes this sublation because it is the accomplishment (*Vollendung*) of Judaism and of its exclusiveness."¹⁶ The refusal of Jews to acknowledge their fundamentally anachronistic nature was, for Bauer, also characteristic of their inherent backwardness. As he put it, "everywhere Christianity demonstrates that it is a force of progress," thereby implying that Judaism was a force of backwardness. However, it was not "Christianity as such [that] liberated the souls of the eighteenth century and broke the chains of privilege and monopoly, but humanity, that humanity which within Christianity represented the apex of civilisation."¹⁷ He continued: "If the Jews want to become free, they should profess belief not in Christianity, but in the dissolution of Christianity, in the dissolution of religion in general, that is to say, in Enlightenment."¹⁸

By depicting the trajectory of human progress in terms of a temporal line that spans from Judaism to Christianity to finally arrive at secular Enlightenment, understood as the zenith of civilization, Bauer was in many respects speaking in Hegel's language about the historicity of religions. In his interpretation of Hegel's teleology, however, Bauer's position, as Moggach suggests, can be described as a "republican rigorism." Accordingly, "the prospect of citizenship is open to all in-

dividuals, but only insofar as they can demonstrate the appropriate ethical commitment to the transcendence of particularity. They may not, for example, raise any claim to emancipation based upon private interest, without disqualifying themselves as genuine republicans."¹⁹ This "republican rigorist" position has crucial implications for the idea and exercise of freedom. Whereas the Hegelian republican theory of freedom – namely, the tradition in which Bauer positioned himself – understood it as "the unity of concept and objectivity,"²⁰ namely as the unity between the conception of freedom and its concrete actualization in and through the state, Bauer considerably shifted the terrain. He established a concept of freedom as the dismissal of religion and, as such, as a given, *a priori* category which does not require mediation, or objectivation, and thus refers back to the "ought."²¹ In other words, Bauer framed the idea and ideal of emancipation as a one-way street, namely that of being non-religious. Instead of the liberal rhetoric of freedom as free choice, here choice instead becomes obligation, *aut-aut*, fundamentally an act of enforcement. Furthermore, since Bauer conceived of Judaism in particular as an alien culture and an inferior religion as compared to more historically developed religions like Christianity, he exhibited a version of what has been more recently called "culturalist differentialism" – i.e., a system of cultural (religious, customary and so forth) differences that operates like a system of racial differences as a means of establishing divisions and hierarchies between individuals and human collectivities.²²

Ultimately, Bauer's analysis of the Jewish question presented a threefold structure according to which (a) the condition of alienness and lack of rights of the Jews could be remedied through; (b) their assimilation into the universal political community of equal citizens, which required the dismissal of religion and (c) promised to bring about emancipation, albeit via a moment of enforcement. As I shall analyze shortly, this same threefold structure can be found in the discussion on Muslims integration in France as well.

The False Dilemma of Religion versus Emancipation: Karl Marx

In 1844 the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* published *On the Jewish Question (Zur Judenfrage)*, which constituted Marx's critical review of the texts by Bruno Bauer.²³ Marx began by questioning whether the existence of religion could truly be regarded as an obstacle to the granting of citizenship rights, that is, to political emancipation. By referring to the example of the North American states, where the question was authentically secular and political, to the extent to which there was neither state religion, nor an official religion of the

majority, Marx showed how political emancipation could historically coexist with religion in the private sphere. Thus, political and human emancipation should not be conflated. "The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that (...) the state can be a free state without man being a free man."²⁴ In this, Marx shared with Bauer the idea that religion is the expression of a limit, "the existence of a defect."²⁵ However, the origin of this defect for him could only be sought in "the nature of the state itself" since religion is not the cause, but only "the manifestation of secular narrowness (*weltlichen Beschränktheit*)."²⁶

By relieving religion from the accusation of being a threat to political emancipation, Marx was questioning the very foundation upon which Bauer's argument was based: that is, the idea that the maintenance of religion in general and of Judaism in particular, was the obstacle to obtaining political rights and a threat for the secular state. Following this strain of critique, Marx proceeded to deconstruct the very presupposition upon which the second line of Bauer's argumentation was based; namely, the idea that Judaism was an alien body fundamentally hostile to the promise of universality and equality of the state. Here Marx's argument notably revolves around the analysis of the separation and contradiction between the political state and civil society. Whereas the former is the arena of the "general interest", the latter is that of the "private interest."²⁷ As a consequence, individuals can be politically emancipated and thus participate in the universality of the state, without being humanly emancipated, namely without being liberated from their particularities (religion, private property, or lack thereof, and so forth).²⁸

This set of arguments, in the end, enabled Marx to rebut the very idea according to which political and human emancipation go through the allegedly free choice of taking the one-way road of dismissing religion. His analysis provides formidable insights for questioning the notion that emancipation can be the result of an enforcing act, as per the suppression of religion. For Marx, the real question to ask was not, *à la* Bauer, if the Jews had the right to ask the state to give them rights; nor was his point to "assert that they [the Jews] *must* overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions".²⁹ Instead, the real question to ask was whether "the standpoint of political emancipation gives the right to demand from the Jew the abolition of Judaism and from man the abolition of religion?"³⁰ The point was to investigate: "What kind of emancipation is in question? What conditions follow from the very nature of the emancipation that is demanded?"³¹ For Marx it is only the overcoming (*Aufhebung*) of secular restrictions that can bring about the overcoming (*Aufhebung*) of the human need for religion.

Once we have established that the abolition of religion is not conducive to political emancipation, how has it come to be that an act of enforcement such as the demand to dismiss religion could be regarded as an act of liberation and human emancipation? In the end, for Marx the oxymoron of enforced emancipation was the expression of the contradictions lying at the heart of the universalism of the political state itself. While envisaging equality and freedom as the *ends* embedded in the very fabric of the universalism of rights, the inequalities of civil society upon which the state was founded, meant the concrete absence of the *means* to achieve those ends. Furthermore, Marx understood that "the abstract universalism of rights – as Kouvelakis put it – rests on an anthropological figure that defines the subjects of these rights and (...) functions according to a 'principle of hidden exclusion.'³² This anthropological figure was that of the "abstract universal individual" which, insofar as it was "articulated as the foundation of a system of universal inclusion (...), could also be used as a standard of exclusion by defining as non-individuals those who were different from the singular figure of the human."³³ The foundations of the culturalist differentialist articulation of the inequalities of civil society, thus, were inscribed in the "anthropological" constitution of the abstract universalism of the political state.

The Debate on 'Conspicuous Religious Symbols' in France: Against the "Fanaticism of Difference"

As I previously suggested, the Bauer-Marx quarrel is of particular interest for shedding new light on the contemporary debate on Muslim integration in France. More specifically, the French controversy over the wearing of religious symbols in public schools, exemplifies in a condensed way the "republican rigorist" and "culturalist differentialist" dimensions that were proper to Bauer's position. This occurs because, within the coordinates of this contemporary controversy in particular, religion, i.e. Islam, has been explicitly targeted for being an obstacle to republican emancipation. This is not unlike the way Judaism was targeted for being an obstacle to the final goal of republican emancipation, which Bauer had set for the Prussian State back in the 1840s.

Since 2004, with the passing of the Law no. 2004–226 on March 15, "The wearing of signs or clothing, which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations is prohibited" in public elementary, middle and high schools. The law was based upon the report "Secularism and the Republic" (*Laïcité et République*) prepared by a special commission appointed by President Chirac in 2003 and chaired by Bernard Stasi. In its concise articulation, the Stasi Report presents in a nutshell

the main arguments, soon to become mainstream, upon which the debate on Muslim integration in French society would rest up to the present. In spite of the diversity of positions held by the members of the committee both on the meaning of *laïcité* and on the appropriateness of a measure like the ban of religious symbols in public schools, they reached consensus around the need for a “‘semiotic’ weapon” – in Jansen’s words – against the “exceptional ‘threat’ to French public order by Islamists groups”.³⁴ In the end indeed only one member of the Stasi committee, i.e., Jean Baubérot, abstained, whereas all others voted in favor of the legislation. Since it represents a valuable resource both for understanding the French “culture of laicism”,³⁵ as well as the main coordinates of the contemporary discussion on Muslim integration and its resemblances with the Jewish Question debate, I will thus focus mainly on an analysis of this text, particularly on those passages which clearly resemble the threefold structure of the republican rigorist and cultural differentialist arguments put forward by Bruno Bauer: (a) the accusation of being a threat to national unity, that is, of alienness and backwardness; (b) the demand for assimilation; (c) emancipation defined as an individual dismissal of religion and subordination to national identity.

Alienness and backwardness: First, the report presented the ban of religious symbols at school as a measure to defend *laïcité* – secularism – which is defined as “the universal principle and the republican value”, upon which “the unity of the nation is founded.”³⁶ The reasons that prompted the need for a law to affirm *laïcité*, in the words of the Commission, were that this supreme value of the Republic was increasingly threatened by the “difficulties of integrating those who arrived on the national territory in recent decades.”³⁷ Poverty and discrimination were identified as the breeding ground for the development of potentially anti-Republican subversion in the form of a “fanaticism of difference” that nourishes communal logic.³⁸ It is particularly in the so-called *quartiers sensibles* (literally, sensitive neighborhoods) that the commission saw communalism developing. In the *quartiers sensibles*, according to the Stasi report, schools cannot intervene to block communalism (*communautarisme*) from spreading because they have themselves become socially and ethnically homogenous.³⁹

In this context, the commission identified the veil worn by Muslim girls who attend these schools as the most visible sign of the spread of communalism, or of the “fanaticism of difference.” According to the Stasi report, these girls, and women in general, are “the first victims of the degradation of the social situation”⁴⁰ as well as “of a resurgence of sexism resulting from different pressures and verbal, psychological, or physical

violence.”⁴¹ Although there might be “girls or women who wear the veil voluntarily,” for the commission “others do that under constraint or pressure. This applies to pre-teen girls who are forced to wear the veil, sometimes by violence.”⁴² As a consequence, one can see that, “although the law applied to Jewish boys in skullcaps and Sikh boys in turbans” – as Joan W. Scott argues – “as well as to anyone with a large cross around his or her neck, it was aimed primarily at Muslim girls wearing headscarves.”⁴³

Commenting on the prominence of the veil affair in the context of this debate, the French feminist sociologist Christine Delphy stated that the Muslim woman who wears the veil has become “the alien that lands” in French society.⁴⁴ The problem with this “alien” is that it makes Islam visible, it interrupts the tacit agreement according to which Islam can be tolerated “only on the condition of being discrete, preferably invisible!”⁴⁵ The document thus, on the one hand, clearly identifies the Islamic religion as the main threat to the unity of France and Muslims as the potential initiators of communal secession within the Republic; on the other hand, it implies that both communalism and the treatment of women are indicators of the retrograde character of the Islamic religion. In so doing, Muslims are implicitly charged with operating as an alternative “nation within the nation,” thereby resembling the accusation that was addressed against the Jews in the heat of the nineteenth century debate over their political emancipation.

Assimilation: The mainstream position in support of the ban on the Muslim headscarf demands that Muslims fuse into the totality of French society, that they accept the universal principles of the secular Republic over the particularistic precepts of their religion; in short, that they assimilate. Secularism – the report argues – demands “an effort of accommodation from all religions”, that is, “an effort of interpretation in order to conciliate the religious dogma and the laws that govern society”.⁴⁶ However, as the report continues, Islam in particular is to be encouraged “to find within its own history the sources that can allow it to adapt to a secular framework”.⁴⁷

The French model of integration is based upon *jus soli* and assimilation *de facto*: the former establishes citizenship as a right by residency rather than by descent, while the latter demands all citizens to conform to French culture and values and refuses the recognition of group identities in the public sphere. Although both *jus soli* and assimilation have been an integral part of the French model of citizenry since the nineteenth century, it is particularly after the Algerian war of independence and the increasing presence of immigrants and citizens of Maghreb origin on French territory that assimilation becomes somewhat of an obsession, the

generator of political hysteria and anxiety for the French state.⁴⁸ Besides the Algerian war, a turning point in the genealogy of Islamophobia in France was 1989 when three girls of north African descent were banned from a school in Creil for wearing the headscarf and thus breaching *laïcité*. As MacMaster argues, it was no accident “that the raging controversy over the integration and assimilation of ethnic minorities should center on the state school.”⁴⁹ At the end of the 1980s, migration specialists in France endorsed the idea that the positive integration of immigrants from southern Europe in France “had been achieved through the institutions and associations of the French working class (the PCF, trade unions, sports clubs) and the Catholic Church. By the 1980s such bridges into French society were no longer functioning.”⁵⁰ Thus, in a scenario in which the traditional agencies of socialization were lacking, the school was addressed as the only and most powerful assimilating institution, as the place devoted to the “systematic molding of all children, regardless of ethnic origins, into the universal values of the Republic.”⁵¹

Emancipation as individual dismissal of religion: In France, school has come to symbolize the microcosm of society in general, and of the public sphere in particular. As the Stasi report emphasizes, the centrality of school to the secular republic is due to the fact that it was at school that the question of secularism “was born in the nineteenth century.”⁵² Here the reference is to the Ferry laws in the early 1880s that established secular and compulsory schooling for all citizens. Like the state on a small scale, the school is depicted in the report as the place that “ensures autonomy,” “presupposes common rules,” and “is often the only place of integration.”⁵³ In part replacing the Ferry laws’ idea of the school as the arena of transition from private to public, the school has now become “a miniature version of the nation, conceived as a collection of abstract individuals who were shorn of any identity other than their French citizenship. As in the representative bodies of the nation, so in the schools, universalism meant conformity to the same rules, and membership in only one “cult,” the republic.”⁵⁴ In this scenario, the veil worn by Muslim girls is presented as “a source of conflict and divisions”⁵⁵ that contrasts with the idea of the school as a place of “neutrality.”⁵⁶ Though, as noted, the French public school is like the state on a small scale, unlike the state – as the arena in which citizenship, equality and integration are established by law as the very conditions of possibility of the state itself – the school has the specific and unique role to “welcome not simply users, but students who are *destined to become* enlightened citizens.”⁵⁷ Thus, emancipation equals entrance into the universality of the state as autonomous individuals; namely, as individuals who are already abstract

and universal subjects when they arrive at the door of the public arena, as it were. Yet, that selection at the door, to keep the metaphor, clearly shows not only that the supposedly abstract individual presupposes a determined anthropological type which excludes, rather than includes, those who do not fall under its rubric (see above), but also, that those who do not already possess the traits of universality will never be allowed to enter it.⁵⁸

Ultimately, the structuring of the debate on the Muslim Question in the case of the controversy over the wearing of religious symbols in public schools, shows the same threefold argumentation that we saw in Bauer at the time of the Jewish Question debate: as the argument goes, (a) the condition of alienness of Muslims could be remedied through (b) their assimilation into the universal political community of equal citizens, which requires the dismissal of religion and (c) promises to bring about emancipation, albeit via a moment of enforcement. The paradox of establishing emancipation as simultaneously an achievable end through the mediation of the law, and an inner trait of (certain) individuals, therefore by definition unavailable (to others), is the specific puzzle that derives from – as I called it in the case of Bauer’s *Judenfrage* – the combination of republican rigorism and culturalist differentialism. Two more antinomies derive from this latter combination, both interrogating the relationship between means and ends in the pursue of emancipation as a condition antithetical to the maintenance of (a certain) religion: the antinomy of emancipation as an end without means and the antinomy of emancipation as an end pursued by means of its negation, namely enforcement.

The Antinomy of Emancipation as an End without Means

As I discussed in the previous section, the establishment of schools as a supposedly universalist and neutral institution claiming, on the one hand, to provide individuals with the *means* for achieving emancipation (whereby the means are education to citizenship) and, on the other hand, demanding those individuals be already ‘emancipated’ before they are allowed to possess those very means, is the instantiation of an important antinomy; I call this antinomy “emancipation as an end without means.” Arguably, the state exhibits the same antinomial structure. While requiring Muslim citizens in general, and Muslim girls wearing headscarves in particular, to participate in the public sphere as universal and abstract individuals, the French state does not, however, provide them with the tools, in the form of economic, social and cultural rights, by means of which they could potentially engender such participation.⁵⁹

Research findings in France show that the prevalent location in the least qualified segments of the working

class of Muslim families (of North African, Sub-Saharan African and Turkish descent) is the main factor behind the trajectories of exclusion of their children at school and in the transition to work.⁶⁰ Given a scenario of poor academic results among Muslim youth in general, however, studies also point to the better academic results of girls in comparison with boys of same origin. For instance, the *baccalauréat* pass rate is 74% for girls and 43% for boys of North African origin, most with a Muslim background.⁶¹ One element, which is far less emphasized, though, is the fact that in a context in which the female school population in general overachieves compared to the male one, Muslim girls' academic results are still significantly lower compared with those of their female peers of "French" descent. Not only are they still under-represented in secondary school paths leading to higher education, but they also have higher dropout rates compared to those of young girls of non-immigrant origin.⁶² Despite what has been called the second-generation immigrant girls' "greater desire for emancipation" through education⁶³ and their greater capacity to adapt to the demands of school in comparison with boys, social class is still regarded as "the primary determinant of variations in educational achievements."⁶⁴ Empirical evidence from qualitative research that I conducted in Marseille between 2010 and 2011 with girls of North African descent (most of whom are Muslim), also showed that the generally disadvantaged position of Muslim girls in education, impacts negatively on their later position in the labor market.⁶⁵ For instance, one of the neglected aspects concerning discrimination against Muslim youth in general, and veiled girls in particular, pertains to the availability of internships (*stages*).⁶⁶ Beside scholarly evidence, a quick look on the Internet immediately displays a number of blogs and websites with protests by veiled young girls who were refused internship and jobs because of their clothing. Since 2004, the HALDE (*Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Égalité*) has received hundreds of complaints of job discrimination on the grounds of religion, and most of them involved Muslims.⁶⁷ "Women filed 57 percent of the complaints relating to religious discrimination and most of these involved the wearing of the headscarf."⁶⁸ As one employee at a *mission locale* in a neighborhood of Marseille said during an interview (May 2011): "We know already that veiled women are not hired for certain jobs. Our task is to create a bridge between employers and potential employees, so we know employers do not want them [...] The jobs that they can do are mostly as cleaners, for companies or private households." This latter element highlights another crucial aspect of disempowerment and segregation experienced by young Muslim women in the labor market. As in most European countries, labor market discrimination expe-

rienced by young Muslim women (and non-Western women more generally) pertains to the type of job accessible to them, mostly in the care and domestic sector.⁶⁹ This is a sector not only characterized by a lack of contract regulations, health and social benefits, and very exploitative working conditions, but also by its socially constructed status as a non-productive, feminine, unskilled and servile type of work.⁷⁰ Yet, even in the care and domestic jobs in which ethnic minorities and Muslim women find employment opportunities, career advisors and trainees strongly discourage the wearing of the headscarf; its absence in the work place is seen as a sign of integration and emancipation.⁷¹

Ultimately, not only does the lack of social, economic and cultural rights prevent Muslim girls from entering the promised land of emancipation and equality in the public sphere, but also it reveals the contradictions at the heart of the political universalism of the state whereby religion is a mark of individual identity (or a particularity) that the French state politicizes, whereas social class and poverty are defined at the outset as non-political distinctions which can therefore continue to operate and divide.

The Antinomy of Emancipation as an End Pursued by Means of its Negation, Namely Enforcement

The definition of emancipation as a condition irreconcilable with the maintenance of religious practices, as in Bauer, necessarily prefigures the dismissal of religion as the *sine qua non* for its attainment. In other words, republican rigorism posits emancipation as equivalent with the absence of religion and, therefore, as a condition that can be attained only in one, pre-determined way, thereby opening the possibility for its enforcement. The same equation affects the structuring of the French debate on conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. Since emancipation here coincides with the absence of religion from the public sphere, its pursuit can entail an act of (law) enforcement, such as the obligation of unveiling in the 2004 law. In this section, I would like to consider this equation again from the standpoint of the dichotomy between means and ends and the antinomy it generates.

The positions that consider unveiling as the precondition to achieve individual emancipation as the end of the secular republican project, clearly regard law enforcement as a mean – albeit undesirable – which can put in place a process leading towards this noble end. But what is it meant, here, by emancipation as a desirable end in the name of which enforcement is justified? And what is the relationship between the means adopted and the end towards which they are deployed? The discussion concerning the relationship between means and

ends was famously structured by theories of political realism in instrumental terms; accordingly, the ends justify the means and therefore, even morally reproachable means, like forms of enforcement and even forms of violence, can reasonably be adopted if they serve morally desirable ends. In *On Violence*, Hannah Arendt famously put forward a sophisticated critique of the instrumentalist approach to means and ends as a confusion between political action and fabrication. The end of human action, unlike that of fabrication – she argued – “can never be reliably predicted.”⁷² It is even more so in the case of violence, which “harbors within itself an additional element of arbitrariness.”⁷³ The goal to which a violent act is directed in fact tends to be overwhelmed by the means it justifies. Arendt’s discussion of violence was conceived both as a critique of neo-Weberian theories of violence as the legitimate monopoly of the state, but also of anti-colonial violence. One of the main targets of Arendt’s intervention was in fact the influential work of Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*,⁷⁴ which she critically targeted for praising violence for violence’s sake.⁷⁵ Yet, by criticizing Fanon on the same grounds of the critique she offered of state violence and by treating all expressions of violence as equally instances of ‘overwhelming means,’ the Arendtian critique of the instrumentalist approach to means and ends is no longer sufficient to provide an analysis of what happens to the end of political emancipation when it is pursued by means of the symbolic violence of state law enforcement, as in the French case. Arendt’s formalistic critique in fact fails to adequately differentiate between state and non-state violence, and therefore, to consider the agency involved in the relationship between (violent) means and (just) ends. Who does define the ‘justness’ of the ends? Who does employ those means and for “whose” ends? Are the subjects involved in the dialectic of means and ends in a symmetrical power relationship, or are they in a relation of domination and inequality? How does this asymmetry affect the meanings that the ‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’ give to emancipation?

When we transpose these issues in the context of the debate over the anti-veil law and the Muslim Question in France, it becomes apparent that the enforced character and symbolic violence of the legislative measures against the visibility of Islamic religious practices, cannot be addressed simply as a problem, à la Arendt, of the unpredictability and overbearing nature of the violent action, or as means that spoil an otherwise potentially upright path to emancipation. The French state stands vis-à-vis the Muslims in a power relation profoundly marked by the colonial past.⁷⁶ This uneven relationship, which is a relation of submission, of master to slave – as Fanon argued – entails that the goal of emancipation that is set by the post-colonial French state in a setting which still bears colonial power dynamics, is fundamen-

tally a continuation of the “civilizing mission” (*mission civilisatrice*).

One of the most noticeable effects of the anti-religion law(s) has been that of increasing the role of religion as a mark of political identity and political dissidence. As has been highlighted by a number of studies, many Muslim girls and women more generally increasingly explain their choice to wear the veil as an act of resistance in response to their experiences of attacks against Muslims in Europe.⁷⁷ Hence, *veiling rather than unveiling—religious visibility rather than invisibility—has come to signify emancipation*: namely, emancipation from impositions that are perceived as ultimately imbricated with colonial paternalism and as being fundamentally racist. Thus, when the French post-colonial state says women’s liberation, the Muslim *man* hears the colonial master attempting to appropriate his women and the Muslim *woman* sees two patriarchies fighting over her body.⁷⁸ When the French post-colonial state says secularism, the Muslim hears the name of another religion to which he or she is asked to convert. When the French post-colonial state says emancipation, the Muslim hears servitude.

As Marx subtly suggested in *On the Jewish Question*, the oxymoron of enforced emancipation was an instantiation of the violence imbued in a constituent moment of the political universalism of the state. Marx himself did not discuss religious discrimination as experienced by oppressed people in colonial or post-colonial contexts. This would have added an important dimension to his and Engels’ reproaches against measures to prohibit religion. As Engels wrote, after the Paris Commune, to the Blanquist fugitives who wanted to abolish religion by decree, “persecutions are the best means of promoting disliked convictions. So much is certain, that the only service, which may still be rendered to God today, is that of declaring atheism an article of faith to be enforced.”⁷⁹ Nowadays, in a context of widespread and increasingly legitimized racism, which is – as Gilbert Achcar writes – “a natural corollary of the colonial heritage, persecutions of the religions of the oppressed, the ex-colonized, should not be rejected only because they are the ‘best means of promoting disliked convictions.’ They should be rejected also and above all, because they are a dimension of ethnic or racial oppression, as intolerable as political, legal, and economic persecutions and discriminations.”⁸⁰

Conclusions: Jewish Question, Muslim Question and Woman Question

Twenty years after the publication of *Die Judenfrage*, Bruno Bauer published another text dealing with the political emancipation of the Jews: i.e., “The Jews as Aliens” (*Das Judentum in der Fremde*). Here, Bauer

identified Jews' allegedly problematic integration into the German political state no longer in their identification with an alternative nationhood and in their religiousness, but this time in their racial inferiority. "This innovation of Bauer's heralded the next stage of anti-Semitism in the modern world."⁸¹ This later racist articulation of his anti-Jewish position was not a deviation from previous more 'culturalist' or secularist position; in many ways, it was inscribed in his specific version of 'republican rigorism' coupled with a form of 'culturalist differentialism' which framed his characterization of Judaism as an alien and inferior culture, an unhistorical religion incapable of historical development. In other words, Bauer's problem with the Jews was, from the outset, not only that they were religious, but *above all that they were Jews*. As a consequence, while his republican rigorism meant an *a priori* characterization of emancipation as the dismissal of religion and as the embracing of secularism, his representation of the Jews was one of *inherent* backwardness and alienness: the racist contours of the political discourse on emancipation had thus been underway for a long time.

As I sought to demonstrate, the contemporary debate on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools in France contains some of the fundamental underpinnings of Bauer's position against the Jews. On the one hand, the Muslim headscarf in France has been interpreted as the most acute and visible symbol of Muslim reluctance to integrate into European societies, that is, of their 'alienness' to the French polity. As in the case of the Jews in the 1840s, the 'problematic' integration/assimilation of Muslims in contemporary France (and Europe more generally) is attributed to their alleged refusal to integrate in the society in which they live. Thus, Muslims are indicted for supposedly attempting to create a separate and alien community within the state, being fundamentally backward and refusing to assimilate. On the other hand, the proposal for their integration is articulated in terms of individual demonstration and of "possession" of dominant social practices, a patent acceptance of the conventions of the state. Muslim women are asked to integrate as religion/less individuals, subjectively, by divesting themselves of a symbol of their religious belonging seemingly not in line with secular requirements. Furthermore, since the secularist framework that informs the whole debate understands religion in general as an illegitimate ground for political expression, and the Islamic religion in particular as oppressive towards women, the French State presents the laws banning the Muslim veil as instantiations of emancipation from patriarchal constraints, or at least as instruments heading in that direction. Today's attitude of the French state towards Muslims thus combines a republican rigorist position, which designates the polit-

ical as the universalist and neutral sphere from which allegedly all religious particularities are banned, and a culturalist differentialist stance which posits Islam as the specific religious particularity which the French State aims to exclude, thereby operating according to a racist register. Two fundamental antinomies derive from the combination of republican rigorism and culturalist differentialism that mark the Muslim Question in the way they marked the Jewish Question back in the 1840s: the first antinomy, or what I called the antinomy of emancipation as an end without means, is generated by the construal of emancipation as participation in the polity, namely as a condition whose accomplishment requires the provision of means – in the forms of cultural, economic and social rights – which the state in fact denies to Muslims. The second antinomy, or what I called the antinomy of emancipation as an end pursued by means of its negation, namely enforcement, is produced by equating emancipation with the absence of religion. This equation is at the origin of anti-religious persecutions, or law enforcement of non-religious practices, as the legitimate mean of the French post-colonial state, whose effect is to deprive emancipation of its anti-paternalistic and self-determining meaning.

There are certainly important differences between the German context in which Bauer and Marx were debating and the French context; unlike the Jewish Question in Germany in the 1840s, the current Muslim Question occurs in a context in which the issue of political emancipation is no longer about the universal extension of citizenship rights beyond class, sex and nationality. Furthermore, in contrast to the German situation in the nineteenth century, in today's France the oppression of women is framed as the specific way in which Muslim backwardness and alienness reveals itself more openly. Yet, in spite of the prominence assigned to women in these discussions, one should notice that in reality they are used in a metaphorical manner, their clothing *symbolizing* Islam's backwardness. Arguably, it is not the "Muslim Question" that is feminized but the "Woman Question," as it were, that is culturalized (or racialized). Though in the present French structuring of the debate, women are put at the center of the stage, the very register of this debate in fact overwhelms and overshadows them; Islam is the particularity that Muslim women are asked by the French state to overthrow in order to be considered *qua* women.⁸² To be sure, the centrality women seem to assume within the Muslim Question debate is one that further reveals both the instrumental nature of this centrality as well as the Orientalist and racist underpinning of the Muslim Question. In other words, as Scott fittingly noted, "racism was the subtext of the headscarf controversy."⁸³

By resorting to Marx's rebuke of Bauer's secularist anti-Jewish stance to analyze the French debate on the

banning of conspicuous religious symbols from public schools, this article has demonstrated, first, the hitherto unexplored and overlooked similarities between the Jewish Question and the Muslim Question debate. Second, in doing so it has contributed to the historical and theoretical debate on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as two versions of a recurring racist trope that has traversed European nations vis-à-vis their internal “others” for centuries.⁸⁴ Finally, since the conflation between political and human emancipation, republican rigorism and enforced emancipation, as well as the established dilemma between religion and the granting of (social, cultural and economic) rights are at the foundation of today’s Muslim Question – as they were of the Jewish Question in the nineteenth century – a critique informed by Marx’s non-reductionist political-economic framework, which he began developing in *On the Jewish Question*, enables us to look at the foundations of the allegedly ‘emancipatory’ universalism of our times, founded upon real inequalities, the antinomies of the unsettled relationship of ends and means, and the false dilemma of racism versus sexism.

NOTES

1. For their comments on previous versions of this article I would like to thank Harrison Fluss, Stathis Kouvelakis, Anne Norton, Nicola Perugini, Catherine Rottenberg, Joan W. Scott and Peter D. Thomas.
2. See Reinhard Rürup “Emancipation and Crisis. The ‘Jewish Question’ in Germany, 1850–1890,” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 20 (1975): 13–25, and Wendy Brown “Tolerance and/or Equality? The ‘Jewish Question’ and the ‘Woman Question.’” *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 15 (2004): 1–31.
3. Clermont-Tonnerre in the December 1789 Assembly, quoted in Wendy Brown “Tolerance and/or Equality?”, 4.
4. Rürup “Emancipation and Crisis,” 61.
5. Nathan Rotenstreich, “For and Against Emancipation: The Bruno Bauer Controversy,” *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 4 (1959): 11.
6. For recent analyses of the “Muslim Question” in the European and American contexts, see Joan W. Scott, “The Vexed Relationship of Emancipation and Equality”, *History of the Present* 2 (2012): 148–168; and Anne Norton, *On the Muslim Question* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
7. Though it is now forgotten, Bauer’s positions were very influential and discussed at his time. For instance, Robert Weltsch defined Bauer’s *Die Judenfrage* as “one of the most illuminating documents for anybody who wants to understand the essence of the political Jewish problem in mid-nineteenth century Germany” (in Robert Weltsch, “Introduction to the Jewish Question”, *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 4 (1959), XII).
8. See Liz Fekete “Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right,” *Race & Class*, 48 (2006): 1–22; Sherene Razack, *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Anne Norton, *On the Muslim Question*.
9. Fekete “Enlightened fundamentalism?”, 8.
10. Nasar Meer, “Racialization and religion: race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamophobia”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (2013): 385–398.
11. Yoav Peled, “From theology to sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the question of Jewish emancipation”, *History of Political Thought* 13 (1992): 463–485.
12. Paul Lawrence Rose, *Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
13. *ibid.*
14. Sandra Bonetto “Race and Racism in Hegel – An Analysis”, *Minerva – An Internet Journal of Philosophy* (10) 2006. Accessed February 10, 2013: <http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol10/index.html>.
15. See Detlef Claussen, *Vom Judenhass zum Antisemitismus: Materialien einer verleugneten Geschichte* (Luchterhand 1987). This historical framing and conceptual clarification is crucial, for it highlights the fact that the atrocities committed against the Jews in the name of anti-Semitism in the twentieth century, had been actually preceded by a longer history of persecutions and casting out that were justified in entirely “cultural” and religious terms.
16. Bruno Bauer, *Die Judenfrage* (Braunschweig 1843): 17 my translation.
17. Bruno Bauer, *Die Judenfrage* (Braunschweig 1843): 17 my translation.
18. Bruno Bauer, “Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu sein”, in *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*, ed. Georg Herwegh (Zürich/Winterthur: Verlag des Literarischen Comptoirs, 1843). Reprinted in Bruno Bauer, *Feldzüge der reinen Kritik*, Afterword by Hans-Martin Sass (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968): 66.
19. Douglas Moggach, *The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 85). On Bauer’s conception of religion and politics see also Massimiliano Tomba “Exclusiveness and Political Universalism in Bruno Bauer,” in *The new Hegelians. Politics and Philosophy in the Hegelian School*, Douglas Moggach ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 91–113.
20. Paul Franco, *Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University of Press, 1999): 172.
21. Douglas Moggach, “Republican Rigorism: Hegelian Views of Emancipation in 1848”, *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 8 (2003): 453.
22. Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?”, in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1999).
23. For a detailed commentary of Marx’s text, including the accusation of it as anti-semitic, I would like to refer to Jacques Aron, Karl Marx, antisémite et criminel? autopsie d’un procès anachronique (Bruxelles: Devillez, 2005) and Daniel Bensaid “Présentation” in Karl Marx *Sur la question juive* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2006).
24. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” in *Marx and Engels Collected Works. Volume 3*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978) 151.
25. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” 151.
26. *ibid.*
27. *ibid.*, 154–155.
28. See Wendy Brown, “Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the ‘Jewish Question’”, in *Identities, Politics, and Rights*, eds. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Keams (University of Michigan Press, 1995), 85–130; Jeffrey C. Isaac “The Lion’s Skin of Politics: Marx on Republicanism”, *Polity* 22 (1990): 461–488. It should be noted at this point that Marx’s distinction between political and human emancipation, with the latter representing the accomplishment of true emancipation,

was not his way of dismissing the former. On the contrary, political emancipation for Marx is “a big step forward (...) it is not the final form of human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world order” (Karl Marx “On the Jewish Question,” 155). For an illuminating analysis of this position in Marx’s text, see Stathis Kouvelakis “The Marxian Critique of Citizenship: For a Rereading of On the Jewish Question”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 104 (2005): 706–721.

29. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” 151.

30. *ibid.*, 150.

31. *ibid.*, 151.

32. Stathis Kouvelakis, “The Marxian Critique of Citizenship,” 711.

33. Joan W. Scott, “Universalism and the History of Feminism”, *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 7 (1995), 3.

34. Yolande Jansen “Secularism and Religious (In-) Security Reinterpreting the French Headscarf Debates”, *Krisis* 2 (2011): 10. For an overview of the different positions on the *affaire du foulard* within the Stasi committee, see also John Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves; Islam, The State and Public Space* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Joan W. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For a Gramscian reading of the headscarf debate and the role of French ‘organic intellectuals’ see Jean Baubérot, “Laïcité and the Challenge of ‘Republicanism’”, *Modern & Contemporary France* 17 (2009), 189–198.

35. Yolande Jansen talks of a French ‘culture of laicism’ to refer to the diffused sensibility that “structures the perception of visible Islamic presence as the sign of a potential threat to public order” (Yolande Jansen “Secularism and Religious (In-)Security”, 10).

36. Stasi Report, *Laïcité et République: Rapport de la commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la République remis au Président de la République le 11 décembre 2003*: 7. Accessed 27 June 2012: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/034000725/index.shtml>.

37. *ibid.*, 6.

38. *ibid.*, 17.

39. *ibid.*, 45.

40. *ibid.*, 46.

41. *ibid.*, 46.

42. *ibid.*, 46–47.

43. Joan W. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 1.

44. Christine Delphy, *Classer, dominer. Qui sont les “autres”?* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008) 156.

45. Christine Delphy, *Classer, Dominer*, 156.

46. Stasi report *Laïcité et République*, 16.

47. *ibid.*, 16.

48. More recently, “republican integration” has become the new official term to refer to the French model of immigrants’ integration in the context of the “civic integration policies turn” across Europe. For an overview of this new development in historical and political context see Danièle Lochak, “L’intégration comme injonction. Enjeux idéologiques et politiques liés à l’immigration”, *Cultures et Conflits*, 64 (2006), 2–14.

49. Neil MacMaster, “Islamophobia in France and the ‘Algerian Problem’” in *The New Crusades. Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, eds. Emran Qureshi and Micheal Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 301.

50. Neil MacMaster “Islamophobia in France”, 301.

51. *ibid.*, 302.

52. Stasi report *Laïcité et République*, 26.

53. *ibid.*, 56.

54. Joan W. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*.

55. Stasi report *Laïcité et République*, 57.

56. *ibid.*

57. *ibid.*, 56–57, my emphasis.

58. On this see more recently Joan W. Scott, “The Vexed Relationship of Emancipation and Equality”.

59. The most comprehensive study of discrimination against Muslims in France still remains Rémy Leveau and Khadija Mohsen-Finan eds., *Musulmans de France et d’Europe* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005).

60. Yaël Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer “Trajectories of Immigrants’ Children in Secondary Education in France: Differentiation and Polarisation”, *I.N.E.D Population (English edition)* 64 (2009), 507–554

61. Yaël Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer “Trajectories of Immigrants’ Children,” 532.

62. Bolette Moldenhawer, Frauke Miera, Jenny Kallstenius, Vera Messing and Claire Schiff ‘Comparative Report on Education’, *Edumigrom Comparative Paper* (2009).

63. Yaël Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer “Trajectories of Immigrants’ Children,” 532; Nacira Guénif-Souilamas, *Des beulettes aux descendantes d’immigrants nord-africains* (Paris: Grasset, 2000).

64. Bolette Moldenhawer, ‘Comparative Report on Education,’ 32.

65. Sara R Farris and Sara de Jong “Discontinuous Intersections: Second Generation Immigrant Girls in Transition from School to Work”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, March, Online First (2013).

66. Yaël Brinbaum and Annick Kieffer “Trajectories of Immigrants’ Children.”

67. Amnesty International, *Choice and Prejudice. Discrimination Against Muslims in Europe*, London (2012).

68. Amnesty International, *Choice and Prejudice*, 40.

69. Mahrez Okba and Frédéric Laine “Jeunes de parents immigrés: de l’école au métier”, *Travail et Emploi*, 103 (2005), 79–93; Francesca Scrinzi “Gender, migration and the ambiguous enterprise of professionalizing domestic service: the case of vocational training for the unemployed in France” *Feminist Review*, 98 (2011), 153–172.

70. Encarnación Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, *Migration, Domestic Work and Affect: A Decolonial Approach on Value and the Feminization of Labor* (London: Routledge, 2010); Rosie Cox, *The Servant Problem. Domestic Work in a Global Economy* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

71. See Francesca Scrinzi “Gender, migration and the ambiguous enterprise.”

72. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Publishers, 1969), 4.

73. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, 4.

74. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Translated by Constance Farrington with a Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Grove, 1963).

75. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, 65.

76. Didier Lapeyronne “La banlieue comme théâtre colonial ou la fracture coloniale dans les quartiers”, in *La Fracture Coloniale. La société française au prisme de l’héritage colonial* eds. Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel and Sandrine Lemaire (Paris: La Decouverte, 2005).

77. Ismahane Chouder, Malika Latrèche, and Pierre Tévanian, *Les filles voilées parlent* (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008).

78. Christine Delphy, *Classer, dominer*.

79. Friedrich Engels, “The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune”, in *Marx and Engels*

Collected Works, Volume 24, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978).

80. Gilbert Achcar, "Marxismes et Religion, hier et aujourd'hui", *ContreTemps. À quels saints se vouer? Espaces publics et religions* 12 (2005), 180.

81. Nathan Rotenstreich "For and Against Emancipation," 35.

82. On the difference between 'race' and 'gender' as operators of political discourses based on toleration and equality, see the illuminating essay by Wendy Brown, "Tolerance and/or Equality?"

83. Joan W. Scott *The Politics of the Veil*, 90.

84. Nasar Meer, "Racialization and religion".

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Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. Sara R. Farris. *Constellations* 21 (2):296-307 (2014).
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How Does the Jewish Question Become the "General Question of the Times?": The Study of Marx's On the Jewish Question [J]. Huang Xuesheng Zou Shipeng - 2008 - *Modern Philosophy* 1:007.
Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages. [REVIEW] Sherene H. Razack - 2004 - *Feminist Legal Studies* 12 (2):129-174.
"On the Jewish Question" is a work by Karl Marx, written in 1843, and first published in Paris in 1844 under the German title "Zur Judenfrage" in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. It was one of Marx's first attempts to develop what would later be called the materialist conception of history. The essay criticizes two studies by Marx's fellow Young Hegelian Bruno Bauer on the attempt by Jews to achieve political emancipation in Prussia. Bauer argued that Jews could achieve political emancipation only Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. *Constellations*. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, 21(2), pp. 296-307. ISSN 1351-0487 [Article]. No full text available. Official URL: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8675.12087>. Item Type: Article. Identification Number (DOI): <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12087>.
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From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. *Constellations* 21(2): 296-307. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12087>. CrossRef Google Scholar. Feldman, Ilana. 2016. *The Muslim Question in Europe: Political Controversies and Public Philosophies*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. CrossRef Google Scholar. Pitts, Jennifer. Republican Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. Sara R. Farris. *Constellations* 21 (2):296-307 (2014). From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation. Yoav Peled - 1992 - *History of Political Thought* 13 (3):463-485. How Does the Jewish Question Become the "General Question of the Times?": The Study of Marx's On the Jewish Question [J]. Huang Xuesheng Zou Shipeng - 2008 - *Modern Philosophy* 1:007. Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal and Social Responses to Forced Marriages. [REVIEW] Sherene H. Razack - 2004 - *Feminist Legal Studies* 12 (2):129-174. Bauer has posed the question of Jewish emancipation in a new form, after giving a critical analysis of the previous formulations and solutions of the question. What, he asks, is the nature of the Jew who is to be emancipated and of the Christian state that is to emancipate him? He replies by a critique of the Jewish religion, he analyzes the religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity, he elucidates the essence of the Christian state and he does all this audaciously, trenchantly, wittily, and with profundity, in a style of writing that is as precise as it is pithy and vigorous. How, then, does Bauer solve the Jewish question? What is the result? The formulation of a question is its solution. The critique of the Jewish question is the answer to the Jewish question. Beneath the discourses of the Jewish and the Muslim Question that suggest that emancipation amounts to the dismissal of religion, there lies a common philosophical and political assumption: a combination of "republican rigorism" and "culturalist differentialism". In this context, the line of critique Marx deployed to refute Bauer's secularist anti-Jewish stance is used to address two antinomies at the heart of the current Muslim Question: that of emancipation as an end without means, and that of emancipation as an end pursued by means of its negation, namely enforcement. The Jewish question was fundamental for politics and philosophy in the Enlightenment. In our time, as the Enlightenment fades, the Muslim question has taken its place. The emancipation of the Jews was central to Enlightenment philosophy and politics. Enlightened statesmen endeavored to change the laws that had relegated Jews to second-class citizenship, and to end the pogroms that had filled Europe with terror. The freedom of Jews to vote, to participate in politics as equals, and to walk through their cities as equals accompanied the expansion of democracy and marked the achievement of liberal constitutions. As the West became more Cite this Item. Part I Muslim Questions. CHAPTER 1 Freedom of Speech. CHAPTER 1 Freedom of Speech. (pp. 15-44).