

EDITING THE
Glosulae super Prisciani Librum constructionum
OF WILLIAM OF CONCHES

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‘We have heard of editions of Aristophanes, of Polybius, of the Iliad, of Ovid, and what not, which have ever been forthcoming under the hands of notable scholars, who have grown grey amidst the renewed promises which have been given.’ So writes Anthony Trollope, rather pessimistically, of Sir Thomas Underwood’s ever unfinished magnum opus in the conclusion to his 1871 *Ralph the Heir*. But his final words breathe the lighter air of optimism: ‘some of these works have come forth, belying the prophecies of incredulous friends. Let us hope that the great Life of Bacon may yet be written.’ Replace, if you will, the ‘great Life of Bacon’ with William of Conches’s *Glosulae super Priscianum*, and the description becomes uncannily apropos. William’s glosses on Priscian have been the object of continually renewed promises and more than one notable scholar has indeed ‘grown grey’ since the two versions of text were first brought to light by Édouard Jauneau. The publication of William’s *Glosulae* has long been a scholarly desideratum and also has been long in reaching the printing-press for one and the same reason: William’s text is central to our understanding of the development of so-called *grammatica speculativa* (although the concept is never named as such in the twelfth century); but central though William may be, that development remains imperfectly understood. William is clearly responding to an earlier (late eleventh- and early twelfth-century) gloss tradition, now known as *the Glosulae*, but the latter has only recently garnered detailed attention, and a full edition of its various redactions still remains in preparation as well. Petrus Helias responded in turn to William’s grammatical thought in his own *Summa super Priscianum* (published in 1993 by Leo Reilly). And there are even more commentaries, some known by their incipits (e.g., *Tria sunt, Promisimus*), others by the schools with which they were associated (e.g., *Grammatica porretana*), many of which remain accessible only in manuscript. In short, there is no shortage of work to be done: the relationships between these various commentaries and the positions that they stake out in the debate over *voces* and *res*, words and things, universals and particulars, are fascinating but inordinately complex. We cannot, however, wait for the dust to settle before sending William’s *Glosulae super Priscianum* to the printer; otherwise, it will remain an *opus semper perficiendum*.

I will have little to say about the relationship between William and his predecessors or successors in the twelfth-century grammatical tradition. This is, after all, a workshop on the *ars edendi* not the *ars grammaticae*. Hence, my focus will be, insofar as possible, not philosophical but philological: namely examples of the textual problems that we have encountered in the process of establishing the text of the *Glosulae super librum constructionum*, that is Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae*, books seventeen and eighteen.

Traditio textus

Allow me to dispense with some preliminaries on the *traditio textus* rather summarily. The glosses survive in two (and perhaps three) recensions: (I) a *versio prior*, probably composed by William in the early 1120s, which comments only upon *Priscianus maior* (i.e. books one to sixteen) and is incompletely preserved (there is a lacuna from *Instit.* 8.30 to 8.93) in Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, San Marco 310 (henceforth M); and (II) a *versio altera*, revised by William circa 1150 near the end of his career, which glosses both *Priscianus maior* (through the beginning of book twelve) and the *De constructione* (that is, books seventeen and eighteen) and is extant only in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, manuscrit latin 15130 (henceforth P). Finally, there exists (III) a possible third redaction in the Laud collection at the Bodleian Library, latin manuscript 67, which differs, sometimes considerably, from both M and P, but it is a short fragment of five folios that covers only *Instit.* 2.12–21. It remains possible that the *Glosulae in Prisciani librum constructionum* as found in P belong only to one version or the other and were never revised. This for two reasons. First, in the accessus of the *versio altera*, William signals his revisions with some precision: “I have undertaken”, he writes, “in my old age to correct the incomplete *glosulae de ortographia* that I wrote in my youth” (P 1ra); the *de ortographia*, strictly speaking, should be only the beginning of the *Institutiones* and it certainly does not include the *De constructione*. Second, in both the *prior* and *altera*, the glosses on *Priscianus maior* cross-reference books seventeen and eighteen with the caveat: *deo annuente uitam*, a disclaimer William often employs to indicate a work planned, but not yet complete. Similarly, P's *Glosulae in librum constructionum* anticipates its later discussions with the same formula: we'll talk about this later, *deo annuente uitam*. Perhaps William simply saw no need to scrub away the residue of his youthful attempt at a commentary, and so retained the caveats, knowing full well that the text was already completed. But I, for one, hold little hope of finding another version (be it *prior* or *altera*) of the *Glosulae in librum constructionum*. For the foreseeable future, at least, P is the best we've got.

Regrettably, P's best is not very good: it presents its editors with considerable challenges. In the case of the *Glosulae super Priscianum maiorem*, it is at least possible to circumvent P's problems by collating it with M and L, where they overlap (and the overlap is considerable), although such a methodology creates further difficulty, in that collating *prior* and *altera* threatens to flatten out and erase their intentional differences. Nonetheless, Stephen Pelle and Michael Elliot have nearly completed a full transcription of the *Glosulae super Priscianum maiorem* in both versions (a Herculean feat in itself), and their work has shown that it is often possible to triangulate a plausible reading through a careful comparison of the different versions. The *Glosulae super librum constructionum*, however, is a tightrope without any such safety net. It is, for better or for worse, a single manuscript edition. And throughout, the scribe – who was less than diligent in his duty, to put it charitably – is continually at loggerheads with his author. Consider, for instance, the following passage, thick with (perhaps) unintentional irony:

- 1 ggra (ad *Instit.* 17.7): Et notandum quod, quamuis omnis ditongus duas obtineat uocales,
 non tamen in omni utraque sonat, sed in quibusdam ultima tantum, ut ae, oe; in quibus- 2
 dam utraque sed altera magis, ut au, eu. Si **querat** aliquis quare in istis utraque sonet, in
 illis altera tantum, dicimus quod u, **que** est ultima in istis, multos habet sonos. [...] Sed, 4
 quamuis una pronunciatur sola, tamen debet utraque scribi. Propter imperitos qui uol-
 unt quicquid uident scriptum pronunciare, instituerunt moderni ut illa sola **que** ibi habet 6
 sonum scribatur, sed tamen ei uirgula **que** sit ditongi nota subscribatur.

One wonders if the scribe wryly smiled to himself as he blithely, perhaps wilfully, proceeded to collapse his diphthongs (highlighted in bold) within this very passage, despite his author's deliberate plea that such a manner of writing was the mark of the *imperiti*, who want pronunciation to map orthography. Although this passage offers no real textual difficulties, it nonetheless neatly encapsulates the main problem that I wish to highlight today: to remain true to our author requires us to read against the scribe; on the other hand, should we remain true to the scribe, we necessarily do the author an injustice. We cannot have it both ways.

Though it may be impolitic to admit as much, it is difficult to have much sympathy for the scribe. Editing P, in fact, could be likened to a death by a thousand paper-cuts, by the continual nick and prick of scribal error. And although I don't want to reduce my remarks to a public airing of my grievances with the scribe, indulge me a few examples (text 2), which will set the stage for problems to come.

- 2 97ra (ad *Instit.* 17.26): EX QVI⟨BVS⟩ HA⟨BVERVNT⟩ NO⟨MINATIONEM⟩, quaedam **ab altero**¹, quaedam ab utroque. 2

¹ab altero *scripsimus*, ablatiuo *P* (ablat'o *pro* abalt'o)

- 87rb (ad *Instit.* 17.5): AV⟨DACITER⟩, quod est regulare, quia nomina tertiae declinationis in datiuo **accipiunt 'ter'**¹ et faciunt aduerbia. 2

¹accipiunt 'ter' *scripsimus*, accipiuntur *P*

- 85vb (ad *Instit.* 17.2): Sic igitur et ⟨**unde**⟩¹ (id est de dictionibus) et quomodo (id est ostendendo illarum constructionem in constitutione² perfectae orationis) in sequentibus tractabitur ostendit. 2

¹unde *coniecimus*, ueram ? *P* ²constructione *a. corr. P*

- 93vb (ad *Instit.* 17.17): Continuatio: Verba non poterant cum obliquis intransitiue construi¹, et non possunt SINE ADIVNCTIONE SO⟨CIARI⟩, id est in eodem praedicato poni; **inde**² reperti sunt nominatiui participiorum ut³ possent uni uerbo⁴ loco alterius sine coniunctione sociari. 2 4

¹construit *a. corr. P* ²inde *scripsimus*, non *P* ³sine coniunctione *add. P, sed redundanter ut uidetur* ⁴uerbo *sup. lin. P*

- 87rb (ad *Instit.* 17.5): Non solum in simplicibus dictionibus hoc fit, scilicet quod deficient, sed IN COMPO⟨SITIS⟩, VT 'INCVBV⟨ERE⟩, ETC.'¹. Sed quaeritur ad quid hoc inducit exemplum, cum in eo nullum sit compositum cuius dictio deficiat. Aiunt: 'ruunt' enim non est compositum, sed intelligendum est quod ibi est² hoc compositum ⟨**ex**⟩³ 'ex' et 'ruunt' 'eruunt', sed subtrahitur 'e', quia 'ex imis⁴ eruunt' in heroico metro esse non potest, cum breuem sillabam inter duas longas habeat. 2 4 6

¹Verg. *Aen.* 1.84–85: incubuere mari, totumque a sedibus imis / una Eurusque Notusque ruunt. ²est *sup. lin. P* ³ex *suppleuimus* ⁴ex imis *scripsimus*, eximi *P*

- 86ra (ad *Instit.* 17.2): Vere ratio tradita de litteris hoc ostendit, quia¹ EA ratio OSTENDIT IVNCT⟨VRAM⟩, id est **coniunctionem**², dictionum **non**³ **factam**⁴ QVOCVMQVE MODO, scilicet n⟨**ominatiuum**⟩ ad⟨**iungi**⟩ praepositioni⁵ et alia multa prohibuit. Sed ostendit illam debere FIERI PER ORD⟨INATIONEM⟩. 2 4

¹quia – ratio ostendit *sup. lin. P* ²coniunctionem *scripsimus*, coniunctione *P* ³solum *add. P* ⁴factam *scripsimus*, facta *P* ⁵cf. *Instit.* 14.14–15 (GL II: 32.21–30)

No one of these errors alone is real cause for alarm, and many of their solutions are transparent (at least in hindsight), but taken collectively and in the company of the some 1500 other critical notes in the first 15 folios alone, they contribute to a general culture of distrust. This distrust threatens to undermine the seemingly necessary foundation of a solid single-manuscript edition: that the manuscript is the product of a reasonably diligent scribe working from a reasonably reliable exemplar. What then are editors to do when they have but a single, demonstrably faulty text: are they to attempt to deduce a hypothetical ‘authorial text’, presumably garbled or truncated by scribal error? or should they simply present the sole surviving copy with minimal intervention and allow subsequent scholars to wrangle with the text on their own? Neither solution is a happy one. If we do the former, we run the risk of publishing yet another redaction: the *Glosulae super Priscianum* by William of Conches, newly revised and expanded by Édouard Jauneau and Andrew Hicks. The second, however, runs the risk of doing the author a serious injustice, permanently attaching his name to a faulty copy of his work (something we would all cringe to have done to our own work). This is, of course, a false dichotomy and the best-case scenario falls somewhere in between. It is both the privilege and the burden of the editor to decide, often case by case, which shade of grey falls to which side of the ever-shifting line. I will offer today a few of these shades of grey, chosen to demonstrate the range of problems with some possible solutions. I’ve arranged these cases into three categories:

1. Menial but puzzling emendations (textual problems with several possible solutions in expository passages of little doctrinal import).
2. Suggestive, but uncertain emendations (passages which *could* be construed as-is, but similar passages elsewhere in the commentary or in other commentaries suggest otherwise).
3. Philosophically motivated emendations (textual problems in philosophical or doctrinal passages where emendation improves the philosophical argument or clarifies the doctrine).

Menial but puzzling emendations

One example concerns the different order of the *partes orationis* in Donatus and Priscian. Donatus discussed the pronoun before the verb, but Priscian after the verb. Here, William summarizes Donatus’s rationale after a long discussion and defence of Priscian’s position. The scribe of P has written as follows (3.1):

- 3.1 93rb (ad *Instit.* 17.18): Donatus tamen **considerans** quod si **pronomen** ideo praeponeretur uerbo quod significat substantiam, **cum** eadem causa pronomen uerbo debet praeponi. 2
Vterque ergo | 93va | bene considerauit, sed Priscianus melius.

Correcting the first *pronomen* to *nomen* is not enough, for P remains grammatically incomplete and something more must give. The parallel passage in Petrus Helias (3.2) helpfully expresses the same thought in a complete sentence, and its syntax approximates P's muddle:

- 3.2 Videns ergo Donatus quod nomen ideo preponitur uerbo quia substantiam significat que prior natura est propria uerbi significatione, putauit quoque ratione consimili pronomen 2
quia substantiam significat debere uerbo preponi (Reilly, II, 622).

On the strength of this parallel we might be tempted to borrow a verb like *putauit*: *considerans* X, *putauit* Y, but then we'd leave the conditional deeply unsatisfied. So it's perhaps better to modify *considerans*, the clear parallel with Helias notwithstanding, and read *considerauit*. Lastly, the sense of *cum eadem causa*, 'for the same reason', seems oddly forced and without precedent: I'm inclined to print *tum*, to be construed as strengthening the apodosis. Thus we emend the passage to read as example 3.3:

- 3.3 Donatus tamen considerauit¹ quod si nomen² ideo praeponeretur uerbo quod significat substantiam, tum³ eadem causa pronomen uerbo debet praeponi. 2

¹considerauit *scripsimus*, *considerans* P ²nomen *scripsimus*, pronomen P ³tum *scripsimus*, cum P

But a second, less intrusive option, is to assume that something, namely the main clause, has gone missing from the end of the sentence, and thus we can simply mark the incomplete thought with a final ellipsis (as in 3.4).

- 3.4 Donatus tamen considerans quod si nomen¹ ideo praeponeretur uerbo quod significat substantiam, tum² eadem causa pronomen uerbo debet praeponi (...). 2

¹nomen *scripsimus*, pronomen P ²tum *scripsimus*, cum P

Or, less intrusive still, we could swallow hard and allow *considerans* as oddly anacoluthic. After all, the stakes are low, the meaning is clear, and it's not worth losing much sleep over it.

A second low-stake example is found on fol. 96r. The passage here concerns the proper answer to the interrogative *uter*. According to William, Priscian believes that only *quis* inquires after substance; all other interrogatives concern the

accidents of substances. So William poses the question: does *uter* inquire after substance or accident? P gives the answer as in 4.1:

- 4.1 96ra (ad *Instit.* 17.24): Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam sit repertum, **occuret** repugnat illud quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: uter istorum legit **et** iste.

It's probable that *occuret* should be *occurr<it> et*, and indeed *occurrere* occurs elsewhere in William's writings as synonymous with *repugnare* (e.g. *multa uidentur huic sententiae occurrere*: *Drag.* 6.19.6). Likewise, it's clear that the final *et* must be excised. But what does the *quod* clause counter and contradict? Certainly not the first half of the sentence, with which it is entirely in agreement. And so it seems again that we have several options, none fully satisfactory. First, we could (as in 4.2) introduce a *non* in the main clause: 'if we say that *uter* has *not* been devised in order to inquire after substances, this is countered and contradicted by the fact that a substance is answered in reply'.

- 4.2 Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam <non> sit repertum, occur<it> et¹ repugnat id² quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: 'uter istorum legit?³ iste'.²

¹occurrit et *scripsimus*, *occuret* P ²illud *a. corr.* P ³et *add.* P

But it remains possible that the passage has been truncated by homeoteleuton and that it originally offered both substance and accident as equally non-viable alternatives. While it would be rash to expand the text to suggest what may be missing, we could (again) print an ellipsis between *repertum sit* and *occurr<it>* to indicate the break in thought as in 4.3.

- 4.3 Si autem dicimus quod ad quaerendum substantiam sit repertum, <...> occur<it> et¹ repugnat id² quod ad ipsum substantia respondetur, ut hic: 'uter istorum legit?³ iste'.²

¹occurrit et *scripsimus*, *occuret* P ²illud *a. corr.* P ³et *add.* P

Neither solution, however, changes the substance of William's argument.

Suggestive but uncertain emendations

A first example of a suggestive emendation concerns the proper meaning of *quid* in the question *quid agit?*, a question raised by *Institutiones* 17.25: *uidemur tamen etiam substantiam ipsius actus quaerentes dicre 'quid agit?', cui respondetur 'nihil' vel 'currit, loquitur'*. According to William (and Petrus Helias), *quid* here is equivocal

and is either accusative or adverbial. In P the explanation, which seems refreshingly free from the usual errors, reads as follows (this is 5.1):

- 5.1 96vb (ad *Instit.* 17.25): Continuatio: Quamuis per aduerbia quaeruntur accidentia actus et passionis, TAMEN VIDE⟨MVR⟩ DICERE ‘QVID AGIT?’, QVAE⟨RENTES⟩ SV⟨BSTANTIAM⟩ A⟨CTVS⟩, ut expositum est. Et attende quod haec quaestio ‘quid agit iste?’ est multiplex. Potest enim ‘quid’ esse accusatiuus casus, et tunc quaeritur substantia rei in quam transit actus, et tunc responderi debet accusatiuus, [I] ut ‘quid agit iste?’, **id est** ‘domum’ uel aliquid tale. Sin autem nomen est pro aduerbio, nullius est casus, et tunc quaeritur quae species actus inest isti, et tunc debet responderi uerbum uel nichil, [II] ut ‘quid agit iste?’, **id est** ‘quae species actus inest isti?’: ‘legit’ uel ‘currit’ uel ‘nichil’. De hac quaestione in tali sensu hic agit Priscianus. Sin autem ‘quid’ construatur cum alio uerbo, ut ‘quid legit?’, est tantum accusatiui casus, et tunc sola substantia rei in quam transit actus quaeritur. 10

The text remains, perhaps, perfectly understandable as it stands, but it does seem odd that the *id est* that follows the two articulations of the question *quid agit iste?* functions on two different levels. In the first case – *quid* as accusative (lines 5–6) – *id est* introduces the answer: ‘what’s he doing?’, *id est*, ‘a house’ or the like. In the second case, however, – *quid* as adverbial (lines 7–8) – *id est* clarifies the question by offering a paraphrase: ‘what’s he doing?’, *id est*, ‘what species of act is present in him?’. Once again Petrus Helias presents no such difficulty, for in his *Summa*, each *id est* offers a clarifying paraphrase (5.2):

- 5.2 Notandum tamen quod duobus modis potest intelligi hec locutio ‘Quid agit?’ ut ‘quid’ ponitur in vi adverbii vel in vi nominis, et ita duplex potest esse interrogatio et duplex potest fieri responsio, ut si queratur, [I] ‘quid agit?’ **id est**, ‘quam rem agit’ et ‘quid’ sit nomen, debet responderi substantia nominis, ut ‘Domum agit’, vel ‘librum agit’ vel alia huiusmodi. Cum uero queritur [II] ‘Quid agit?’ ut ‘quid’ ponatur loco adverbii hoc uult significare, **id est**, ‘Quam actionem exercet?’ et tunc debet responderi forma ipsius uerbi, non autem nomen, ut ‘Quid agit’, ‘Legit’ vel ‘Currit’ vel aliquid aliud (Reilly, II, 895). 6

It is tempting to borrow from Peter Helias and supply a missing paraphrase for the accusative *quid*: ‘quid agit iste?’, *id est* ⟨quam rem agit iste?⟩, as in 5.3:

- 5.3 Potest enim ‘quid’ esse accusatiuus casus, et tunc quaeritur substantia rei in quam transit actus, et tunc responderi debet accusatiuus, ut ‘quid agit iste?’, *id est* ⟨**quam rem agit iste?**⟩: ‘domum’ uel aliquid tale. 2

Indeed, the repetition of *agit iste* could easily explain the omission of the para-

phrased question. The problem is, however, that William seems not to paraphrase the question in this way, for twice repeated (on lines 4–5 and 10 of 5.1) is the more prolix formula: *quaeritur substantia rei in quam transit actus*. And while we could supply a paraphrase in William’s language – something like: ‘quid agit iste?’, id est <quae est substantia rei in quam transit actus?> – there is no immediately obvious reason why it would have been omitted and admittedly it has no palaeographical grounds. If we supply the first *quid agit?* with a paraphrase, are we correcting a truncation in P or emending William’s own text?

A second example concerns variants in Priscian’s text that suggested multiple interpretations of a single passage. Consider, for instance, William’s interpretation of *Institutiones* 17.17: *Verba personarum quae per nominativum intelleguntur et sunt indicativa [et] absolute accipiuntur*.

- 6.1 93ra (ad *Instit.* 17.17): [I] VERBA SVNT INDI<CATIVA>, id est demonstratiua illarum
 PERSO<NARVM> QVAE INTEL<LEGVNTVR> PER¹ NO<MINATIVVM> pronominis. 2
 Illam enim personam demonstrat hoc uerbum ‘scribo’, quam significat hoc pronomen
 ‘ego’. ACCI<PIVNTVR> ABSO<LVTE>, id est sine discretione personarum. [...] Quidam 4
 aliter exponunt uersum istum sic: [II] VERBA ACCI<PIVNTVR> ABSO<LVTE>, id est
 sine discretione personarum. Sed quia de impersonalibus uerbis erat constans, addit: PER- 6
 SONARVM², id est uerba personalia. Sed ne aliquis pu<taret> quod aliam personam sig-
 nificaret uerbum quam nominatiuus, et sic non posset cum illo intransitiue construi, subi- 8
 ungit: QVAE PER³ NO<MINATIVVM> INTEL<IGVNTVR>. Sed quia magis uidebatur
 de indicatiuis uerbis quam de aliis modis quod facerent discretionem, subdit: ET SVNT 10
 INDI<CATIVA>, id est indicatiui modi. Secundum hanc sententiam, unum solum ‘et’ ha-
 betur in serie litterae. 12

¹per *scripsimus*, pro P ²personarum *scripsimus*, personaliter P ³quae per *scripsimus*, quod po. P

The two explanations given here (marked as I and II in your text) differ primarily in the syntax and semantics of *indicatiua*. The first explanation (lines 1–4) places *indicatiua* in the main clause (*uerba sunt indicatiua*), and it is construed as synonymous with *demonstratiua*, qualified by the objective genitive *personarum*. The second explanation (lines 5–12) locates *indicatiua* in the subordinate clause and glosses it as *indicatiui modi*, while construing *personarum* as *uerba personalia*. These two different readings depend on whether the sentence has one *et* or two (Hertz prints only one, but reports a manuscript with two). William must have read the latter in his manuscript of Priscian, which forces a compound predicate: *Verba persona [...] et sunt indicatiua et absolute accipiuntur*. But William also knew a tradition that glossed the text with only a single *et* (as it is printed by Hertz), which forces

a compound relative clause: *verba personarum, quae per nominativum intelleguntur et sunt indicativa [...]*. Hence, as William notes, this second reading requires that *unum solum* ‘et’ *habetur in serie litterae*.

A similar double reading may lurk behind P’s muddling of a gloss on *Institutiones* 17.19: *manifestum autem, quod ipsius quoque positio nominationis, qua participium nominatum est, non bene servaretur, nisi post nomen et verbum poneretur participium, cum ex eis utrisque per confirmationem pendens ea pars accipiebatur* (GL III, 119.17–20). The question here concerns the reading *confirmationem* in the final clause, which is printed by Hertz with no critical note. P’s comment on this passage, 7.1, vacillates rather unhelpfully between *confirmatio* and *conformatio*.

- 7.1 93vb (ad *Instit.* 17.19): Inde enim dicitur participium quod capit partem illorum antecedentium¹. Et subiungit quare: [I] CVM EA PAR(S) ACCI(PIEBATVR) PE(NDENS) EX EIS. 2
 Ex eis enim esse contrahit, et hoc PER CONFOR(MATIONEM), quia **conformatur** eis. 3
 Recipit enim a nomine genera et casus, a uerbo tempora et significationes. Sed habetur PER 4
 CONFORMATIONEM. Sic legatur: [II] CVM EA PARS, id est cum nomen illius partis 5
 ACCIPIEBATVR EX EIS partibus, id est ex nomine et uerbo. Sed quia duobus modis con- 6
 trahit uox nomen a uoce – per abnegationem, ut nomen dicitur neutrum quia non est mas- 7
 culinum nec femininum, per **conformationem**, id est per proprietatem ex illa contractam 8
 quae nomine ipso exprimitur, ut pronomen quia ponitur pro nomine – ideo², ut ostendat 9
 Priscianus quomodo ex illis nomen accepit, subiungit: PENDENS³ PER CONFORMA- 10
 TIONEM. Deinde per simile ostendit quod, quia ex eis **confirmatur**⁴ uel **conformatur**, 11
 post illa debet poni. Sed QVOMODO POST MAS(CVLINVM) ET FE(MININVM) genus 12
 po| 94ra |nimus NEVTRVM, EORVM ABNEGATIVVM in ordine generum⁵, ergo multo 13
 magis post nomen et uerbum ponimus eorum **confirmationem**, id est participium. 14

¹antecedentium *scripsimus*, accentium (accentuum *a. corr.*) P ²omni *a. corr.* P ³pendens *scripsimus*, peren. P ⁴conformatur *a. corr.* P ⁵generum *scripsimus*, genetiui P

Peter Helias can offer no assistance here, for his *Summa* rarely gets down in the trenches with William to wrangle with the word by word syntax (the *continuatio*) of Priscian’s text. The passage, I think, gains focus if we suppose that William knew two readings, both *confirmatio* and *conformatio*, and this for three reasons. Firstly, it makes good sense of the phrase *sed habetur per conformationem* (lines 4–5), as *habetur* is often used to signal a variant reading (as above: *unum solum* ‘et’ *habetur*). Secondly, and more importantly, it would explain the double gloss wherein the first seems of offer a *realis* interpretation (line 3: ‘the participle receives its being (*esse*) from the noun and verb’), and the second a *uocalis* interpretation (line 5: ‘the *name* of that part of speech, the participle, is taken from the noun and verb’).

Thirdly, it also motivates the quick summation in line 11: *quia ex eis confirmatur uel conformatur*. The question still remains though: which should be *confirmatio* and which *conformatio*? Since *conformatio* seems to lend greater support to the *realis interpretatio* and *confirmatio* pairs well with *abnegatio* in the second explanation (lines 6–9), I’m inclined to read *conformatio* first and *confirmatio* second, as in 7.2:

- 7.2 Inde enim dicitur participium quod capit partem illorum antecedentium¹. Et subiungit
 quare: CVM EA PAR(S) ACCI(PIEBATVR) PE(NDENS) EX EIS. Ex eis enim esse 2
 contrahit, et hoc PER CONFOR(MATIONEM), quia conformatur eis. Recipit enim
 a nomine genera et casus, a uerbo tempora et significationes. Sed habetur PER CON- 4
 FIRMATIONEM². Sic legatur: CVM EA PARS, id est cum nomen illius partis ACCIP-
 IEBATVR EX EIS partibus, id est ex nomine et uerbo. Sed quia duobus modis contrahit 6
 uox nomen a uoce – per abnegationem, ut nomen dicitur neutrum quia non est mas-
 culinum nec femininum, per confirmationem³, id est per proprietatem ex illa contractam 8
 quae nomine ipso exprimitur, ut pronomen quia ponitur pro nomine – ideo⁴, ut osten-
 dat Priscianus quomodo ex illis nomen accepit, subiungit: PENDENS⁵ PER CONFIRMA- 10
 TIONEM⁶. Deinde per simile ostendit quod, quia ex eis confirmatur⁷ uel conformatur,
 post illa debet poni. Sed QVOMODO POST MAS(CVLINVM) ET FE(MININVM) genus 12
 po| 94ra |nimus NEVTRVM, EORVM ABNEGATIVVM in ordine generum⁸, ergo multo
 magis post nomen et uerbum ponimus eorum confirmationem, id est participium. 14

¹antecedentium *scripsimus*, accentium (accentuum *a. corr.*) *P* ²confirmationem *scripsimus* conforma-
 tionem *P* ³confirmationem *scripsimus* confirmationem *P* ⁴omni *a. corr.* *P* ⁵pendens *scripsimus*,
 peren. *P* ⁶confirmationem *scripsimus* confirmationem *P* ⁷conformatur *a. corr.* *P* ⁸generum
scripsimus, genetiui *P*

Philosophically motivated emendations

I conclude with two brief examples of philosophically motivated emendations. The first example, part of the same long discussion of *quid agit* I spoke of earlier, concerns the *substantia actus*, which William considers to be the primary *significatio* of a verb. William’s discussion (8.1), with its frequent repetitions of *actus* and *substantia*, caused considerable problems for the scribe of P, and the numerous false starts and marginal corrections fail to inspire confidence:

- 8.1 96vb (ad *Instit.* 17.25): Et hoc est: SVBSTANTIA ACTVS, certa species actus. Querere
 igitur substantiam actus est quaerere certam speciem actionis. Qui enim quaerit ‘quid agit 2
 iste?’ quaerit quae species actus insit¹ isti. Idem dicitur uerbi substantia, quia principaliter
 significatur a uerbo. Si tempus enim dicitur accidens uerbi quia secundo significatur a 4
 uerbo², ergo³ certa species actus potest dici substantia uerbi, cum principaliter significatur

a uerbo. **Si inferunt ‘si species est actus, substantia actus, ergo actus est substantia actus, et sic idem est substantia⁴ sui’**, uel dicemus⁵ figuratiuam esse locutionem cum dicimus ‘illa est substantia⁶ actus’, id est talis est substantia quae est actus, nec tamen est substantia; uel dicemus quod quando dicitur ‘species actus est substantia’, ut ‘legere’ est substantia actus, non dicimus esse illud substantiam alicuius actus nisi sui, nec alterius⁷, sicuti dicimus hominem esse speciem animalis, nec tamen dicimus ipsum esse speciem alicuius animalis.

¹ei uel *add. P, postea expunctum* ²si inferunt si species actus est substantia uerbi *add. P, postea expunctum* ³ergo – uerbi *add. in mg. P* ⁴actus *add. P, postea expunctum* ⁵dicimus *a. corr. P* ⁶est *add. P, postea expunctum* ⁷alteris *a. corr. P*

The problem here is the central *reductio ad absurdum* (line 6–7, printed in bold), which William feels is damaging enough to warrant at least two counter-arguments in lines 7–9 and 9–12. As P presents the inferential *reductio*, it would seem to translate: ‘if a species is an act, substance is an act, therefore the act is the substance of the act, and thus one and the same thing becomes its own substance’. But William is careful (here and elsewhere) never to claim that a substance is an act (nor that an act is a substance per se). And he seems quite right not to do so. Hence, transposing the first *est* and *actus* in the *reductio* (as in 8.2) brings the damaging inference into greater focus and William’s counter-arguments make better sense: ‘if the species of an act is the substance of an act, then an act is a substance of an act, etc.’.

- 8.2 Si inferunt ‘si species actus est¹ substantia actus, ergo actus est substantia actus, et sic idem est substantia² sui’

¹actus est *scripsimus, trans. P* ²actus *add. P, postea expunctum*

This is the only way that I can make philosophical sense of the passage. But the false start in line 4 (see footnote two in 8.1) further complicates matters, as the scribe began to write: *si inferunt: si species actus est substantia uerbi*, which does not match what he writes when reaches the passage in its proper place.

Little time remains to discuss my final example (9), which concerns Aristotelian primary and secondary substances. Priscian claims that all three verbal persons can be either: *omnis enim persona et generalis et specialis capax est substantiae et qualitatis* (*Institutiones* 17.15). On this passage, P records William’s comment as follows:

- 9 92ra (ad *Instit.* 17.15): OMNIS ENIM, ETC. Merito nomina possunt intelligi in omnibus personis, quia omnis persona capax est illius quod nomen significat et est nominabilis illo

nomine. Et hoc est: <OMNIS> PERSONA, scilicet loquens, quae est prima, et alia, EST
 CAPAX GE<NERALIS> SVB<STANTIAE>, id est illius quod **per nomen**¹ appellatiuum 4
 et substantiium dicitur esse. Nichil aliud enim est secunda uel generalis substantia quam
 uel genus uel species continens primas, † nisi id quod substantia prima dicitur esse **per** 6
nomen² substantiium uel appellatiuum non † est capax GENERA<LIS> QVA<LITATIS>, 8
 quae a nomine significatur, et est capax SPECIALIS SVB<STANTIAE>, quia indiuidua
 substantia est capax SPECIA<LIS> QVA<LITATIS>, id est qualitatis quae uni soli inest.

¹per nomen *scripsimus*, pronomen *P* ²per nomen *scripsimus*, pronomen *P*

One correction was readily apparent: both occurrences of *pronomen* must be *per nomen* (lines 4 and 6), for a *pronomen appellatiuum* would be a contradiction in terms. And if this were not enough, we have confirmation from a later passage that expresses a similar thought (95va: *Generalis substantia est idem quod res per appellatiuum nomen dicitur esse, quod a dialecticis secunda substantia dicitur*). But the passage remains a *locus nondum sanatus* (lines 6–7 in particular) and we welcome any further thoughts as to how to construe this, as well as any of the others passages I have presented today.

The scribe of P has made the task of editing William's *Glosulae super Prisciani librum constructionum* anything but easy, and the fine line between emending P and correcting William of Conches is blurry at best. Which compromise is the better option? are we to maintain the *dubia* where construal is at least possible and consign further speculation to *fortasse intelligenda* in the apparatus? or should we take greater liberties within the main text and banish P's follies to the apparatus? Whatever middle road the final proofs may forge, we must remain vigilant lest we be subject to the same critique that William often feared from his own critics: *fugiendo Scillam, intrasti Caribdim!* (*Glosae super Platonem*, 119.22; *Dragmaticon*, 2.3.6; *Glosulae super Priscianum*, M 62r).

With the existence of cultivators, the government has decided to step in to regulate it. If you become a cultivator, you will have to register as a cultivator in some database. We don't have to worry about that for now since they are still preparing for it, but it will soon become a law that all cultivators must register as one or they'll be fined or even jailed, as the government wants to keep track of the number of cultivators in the world." "It's impossible for the government to stop everyone from cultivating since Cultivation Online is already widespread with billions of active players. It's not like they can stop everyone from playing the game, either." Meixiu then said. We do not translate / edit. Content is for informational purposes only. Problems with the site & chapters? William of Conches (c. 1090/1091 – c. 1155/1170s) was a French scholastic philosopher who sought to expand the bounds of Christian humanism by studying secular works of the classics and fostering empirical science. He was a prominent member of the School of Chartres. John of Salisbury, a bishop of Chartres and former student of William's, refers to William as the most talented grammarian after Bernard of Chartres. Due to a planned power outage, our services will be reduced today (June 15) starting at 8:30am PDT until the work is complete. We apologize for the inconvenience. Theodosiani libri XVI cum Constitutionibus Sirmondianis et Leges novellae ad Theodosianum pertinentes : consilio et auctoritate Academiae litterarum regiae borussicae ediderunt Th. Item Preview. "Hunt a Cocogoat. Please and thank you.". Nine shackles of stone were said to have been laid down deep in the valleys of Cuijue Slope to drive off evil and cleanse the world. Nine Pillars of Peace. Cuijue Slope (Chinese: 九柱山; 九柱山) is a subarea in Minlin, Liyue. Located within the heart of the region are the Nine Pillars and a temple to the center. When you enter the vicinity of the pillars, the sky will suddenly turn dark and gray, and areas outside Cuijue Slope will have an unnaturally dark...