

A Comparative Analysis of Democratic Consolidations After the Third Wave of Democratization

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This paper investigates how democratic consolidations take place in emerging democracies. Series of annual “Freedom in the World Country Rating” are used as indices of democratization while “World Survey Value” data are analyzed to measure the democratic value of each country.

The results show that consolidations in emerging democracies have progressed as a whole in the last fifteen years. It is also found that the types of their pre-democratization regimes and the processes of democratization influenced the democratic consolidation. Among the authoritarian regimes, one-party systems are easiest to achieve democratic consolidation after the regime transition. Conversely, military regimes have difficulties to achieve stable democracy. The more people participate actively in the process of democratization, the smoother the regimes consolidated democracy.

Relationship between democratic consolidation and economic development was also examined. The results show that not only high income but also high economic growth correlated with democratic consolidation. Although it is not the main concern of this paper, among independent variables in democratic regime and economic achievement, economic growth seems to be a key factor in democratic consolidation.

Finally, democratic values are compared among emerging democracies and traditional democratic countries. It is found that people’s positive evaluation to the democratic system and its performance play a crucial role in consolidating democracy.

Keywords: third wave of democratization, democratic consolidation, democratic value

Introduction

In the last quarter of the 20th century, around forty countries experienced regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the world. Historically, according to Huntington (1991/2), these massive democratic changes occurred three times before the 1990s. Huntington named these political mega changes as democratic waves.¹ The first wave started in the 19th century in America and culminated after World War I. During the first wave, thirty or so countries established democratic regimes. The second wave started following the end of World War II and continued until the early part of the 1960s. At that time, ex-colonial states changed to democratic regimes in the process of de-colonization. And the third wave started in the early 1970s in Southern Europe. The wave spread out to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and then to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As a result of the third democratic wave, the percentage of democratic regimes increased from 25% in the early 1970s to 45% in 1990.

The phenomenon of third democratic wave fascinated a group of scholars who specialized in ‘third world development’. They hypothesized that political developments in the third world would follow after their economic developments. But contrary to their expectation, social changes in third world countries were described and analyzed pessimistically in terms of neo-colonialism, dependency, underdevelopment, bureaucratic authoritarianism until the 1970s. When the concept of “third wave of democratization” emerged they saw it as one of the most important political trends in the second half of the 20th century.

At first, they analyzed the causes and processes of democratic transition from authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1991/2; Sørensen 1994; Tulchin and Romeo 1995). Over time, the research topics expanded from the causes or process of democratization to democratic consolidation, which means the duration and strength of democratic regime in emerging democratic countries (Diamond and Platter 2001; Haynes 2001). The issue of democratic consolidation is very important because the past two democratic waves were always accompanied by anti-democratic movements.²

1. The word ‘wave’ is selected to describe movements to one direction which overwhelming reverse movements. So, during the period of wave of democratization not all of the states changed toward democratization.

2. The fascist movements in 1920s and military coups and personal dictatorships in 1960s were regarded as anti-democratic activism to the previous democratic waves.

However, the studies concerning democratic consolidation show contradictory results. Some studies of democratic transition indicate that newly democratized countries have weaknesses such as foreign debts, poverty, and corruption. And these structural conditions restrict the newly democratized countries to consolidate democracy. Diamond (1996) even expresses that the wave of reverse to authoritarian regime occurred from 1992. And regionally until the 21st century, it seems that the third democratic wave had no impact in the Middle East and Central Asia. Excluding Lebanon and Jordan as exceptions, authoritarian regimes still dominate almost all countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.

On the other hand, some empirical researches contend that the democratization processes continued during the 1990s. According to the Freedom House surveys, despite the fact that the increases of freedom in the late 1990s were not remarkable compared to that of the 1980s and the early 1990s the general figures for freedom in the end of the century could be summarized as a century of progress (Karatnycky 1999).

These conflicting analyses over the democratic consolidation mean that the outcomes of democratic transition are still worthy of investigation. This paper raises two questions. First, how did the countries which experienced democratization change after the third wave? After classifying third wave countries into two categories, free and non-free, based on the 2005 freedom rating, I will investigate the cause of differentiation. Second, how does civic culture influence the democratic consolidation process? Using World Value Survey data, I will analyze the relations between democratic value and freedom rating. By analyzing the relations between culture and democracy, I will consider some traditional democratic countries as third wave countries.

Democratization Process After the Third Wave.

First, I enquire how the third wave countries have changed after the transition. The indicators to measure the level of democracy are diverse and may include political participation, political competition, political culture, degrees of the socio-political equality, and civic liberty. In this paper, 'Freedom in the World Country Ratings (Freedom index)' measured by Freedom House is used to measure democratic consolidation. Freedom House began to make efforts to create indices from 1955 and published Freedom Index annually since 1992. Today, Freedom Indices are recognized and employed as a measure of democracy

(Sørensen 1994; Engberg and Ersson 2001).³

Freedom House divides democratic governance into two dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. Each dimension is rated from 1 to 7. The lower the number the more democratic the regime is whereas the higher the number more authoritarian the regime is. Using these two indicators, Freedom House divides the countries into Free (1.0-2.5), Partly Free (3.0-5.0), Not Free (5.5-7.0).

The distribution of Freedom ratings from the 1980s to 2005 shows the numbers and the portions of democratic countries are progressing (See Table 1). In 1980, fifty-one countries, 31.5% of the 162 countries were considered free. At the end of the democratic wave in 1990, 39.4% (65 countries) were categorized as free countries. In 1995, after the collapse of the Eastern socialistic system, 39.8% (76 countries) were categorized as free. For the last 10 years, the number of free countries is still increasing, for example, 44.8% in 2000 to 46.3% in 2005.

Table 1 Diffusion of Democratic Regime [Unit: country, (%)]

Year	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Total
1980-1981	51 (31.5)	52 (32.1)	59 (36.4)	162 (100)
1985-1986	56 (33.3)	55 (33.3)	55 (33.3)	165 (100)
1990-1991	65 (39.4)	50 (30.3)	50 (30.3)	165 (100)
1995-1996	76 (39.8)	62 (32.5)	53 (27.7)	191 (100)
2000-2001	86 (44.8)	58 (30.2)	48 (25.0)	192 (100)
2005-2006	89 (46.3)	58 (30.2)	45 (23.4)	192 (100)

Source: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAAllScores.xls> (2007.4. 27)

Even if a country is categorized as free there may be some countries which are not fully free enough to be compared with traditional democratic countries. But if electoral democracy is considered as a democratic system at minimum, countries with electoral democracy increased from 40% of the 167 countries in 1987 to 63% of 121 countries in 2001 (Freedom House Survey Team 2002).⁴

How about the countries which experienced regime transformation during

3. Many analysts of democracy have a problem with using Freedom House ratings, however in terms of comprehensiveness and over time there isn't any other comparable data series (Haynes 2001:20).

4. Electoral democracy is defined as an establishment of government through fairly managed election by open, competitive, and guaranteed participation.

Table 2 Freedom Rating Changes after the Third Wave

Region	Country	Pre-democratization	1990 ¹⁾	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005
Southern	Greece	6.0 (1973)	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5
Europe	Portugal	5.5 (1973)	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Spain	5.5 (1973)	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0
Eastern	Bulgaria	7.0 (1989)	3.5	2.0	2.5	2.5	1.5	1.5
Europe	Czech Rep. ²⁾	6.5 (1988)	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0
	Hungary	6.0 (1976)	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0
	Poland	6.5 (1986)	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0
	Romania	7.0 (1989)	5.5	4.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0
	Belarus		-	4.5	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.5
	Estonia		-	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.0
	Latvia		-	3.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0
	Lithuania		-	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.0
	Russia ³⁾	7.0 (1986)	4.5	3.5	3.5	4.5	5.0	5.5
	Ukraine		-	4.0	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5
	Nepal	6.5 (1978)	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	5.5
	Turkey	5.0 (1981)	3.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	3.5	3.0
Asia	India	3.5 (1976)	2.5	4.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
Latin	Mongolia	7.0 (1989)	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0
	Pakistan	6.0 (1984)	4.0	4.0	4.5	6.0	5.5	5.5
	Philippines	5.0 (1983)	3.0	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.0
	South Korea	5.5 (1983)	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.5
	Taiwan	5.5 (1980)	3.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
America	Argentina	6.0 (1977)	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.0
	Bolivia	5.5 (1975)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.5	3.0
	Brazil	5.0 (1973)	2.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	2.5	2.0
	Chile	6.0 (1977)	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0
	Ecuador	6.0 (1975)	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.0
	El Salvador	5.0 (1981)	3.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5
	Guatemala	6.5 (1983)	3.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.0
	Grenada	6.5 (1983)	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
	Honduras	4.5 (1979)	2.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
	Mexico	4.0 (1972)	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	2.0	2.0
	Nicaragua	5.5 (1986)	3.0	4.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
	Panama	6.5 (1976)	3.0	3.0	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
	Peru	6.0 (1974)	3.5	5.0	3.5	4.5	2.0	2.5
	Uruguay	6.0 (1979)	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0
Africa	Nigeria	5.5 (1975)	5.0	6.0	6.5	3.5	4.5	4.0
	South Africa	5.5 (1988)	4.5	4.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
	Sudan	6.0 (1985)	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0

1) It stands year under review.

2) and 3) Freedom ratings of the Czech Republic and Russia in 1990-1992 were those of Czechoslovakia and USSR.

Source: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls>.


the third wave of democratization? Huntington (1991/2) writes that thirty-five countries became democratized or liberalized according to the standard of electoral democracy between 1974 and 1990. Nevertheless, to define 1990 as the last moment of the third wave of democratization would be problematic. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and liberalization of Eastern Europe began in the early 1990s. Therefore, I would like to add five Eastern European countries founded in the process of Soviet Union's collapse.⁵ East Germany is excluded from the list of third democratic wave countries because she unified with West Germany. As a result, a total of 39 countries are examined.

Among the thirty-nine countries, there was no country classified as free before the third wave of democratization. Only six countries are evaluated as 'Partly Free'. They are India, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and the Philippines. The remaining thirty-three countries are classified as 'Not Free' (See Table 2). However, in 1990/91, nineteen countries (48.7%) are evaluated as 'Free', eighteen countries (46.2%) as 'Partly Free', and only two, Romania and Sudan, as 'Not Free'. In 2005, there are twenty-five 'Free' countries (64.1%), nine 'Partly Free' countries (23.1%) and five 'Not Free' countries (12.8%). Compared with the figure of 1990/91 the number of 'Free' countries increased from 19 to 25. However, the number of 'Not Free' countries also increased from 2 to 5. In sum, after the third wave of democratization, consolidation of democracy took place in many countries. Nevertheless, some countries failed to stabilize democracy and even regressed to become more authoritarian. This finding suggests that controversial arguments about democratic consolidation have some empirical grounds.

Figure 1 shows the average scores of Freedom index of thirty-nine countries. In the figure, Freedom index has fallen from 5.95 in pre-democratization to 3.19 in 1990. This means countries which experienced democratic transition changed very fast and fundamentally to democracy. But after the third wave of transition, there were some reverse movements or some difficulties in consolidating democracy. The mean score of Freedom Index increased in 1992 and 1993. This proves the 'reverse wave' to authoritarianism was at the peak in 1992. That is, a democratic transition does not assure a democratic consolidation. Huntington (1991/2) also indicated that 3 countries reverted to authoritarianism at the time of 1991.

The reverse wave against democratization could be considered just a temporary setback. The mean score of Freedom Index decreased again since 1993 and

5. These countries are Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine.

Figure 1 Freedom Rating Changes after 1990 (Mean of the 39 Countries)

arrived at 2.51 at 2005. This leads to a tentative conclusion that, although the processes are very slow, democratic consolidations are under way in the countries that were hit by the third wave of democratization. But as seen in Table 2, each country has different rate of democratization and some countries never progress to becoming a democratic regime. Why do these differences happen? I discuss the causes of differentiation in the next section.

Causes of Differentiation in Democratic Consolidation

What prevents democratic progress? This paper presents a hypothesis that “the consolidation process differentiates according to the types of former authoritarian systems and of transition processes.” These two factors might influence the selection of system or ideology in the beginning stage of democratic consolidation. The types of authoritarian regimes and the types of transition processes are followed by the typology of Huntington (1991/2).

The types of authoritarian regimes are one-party system, personal dictatorship, and military regime. These three regimes have common features. All oppress competition and participation. But it seems that the central problems identified in the process of democratic consolidations are different. One-party

system countries have to separate the government from the political party and to make new ideology proper to democratic regime. Personal dictatorship countries need to make and institutionalize a new governing or ruling system. And military regimes should detach military away from political power and contain it to play only the military role.

On the other hand, the types of transition processes are classified as transformation, transplacement, replacement, and intervention. This typology is based on who initiates democratic transition. In transformation, those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play a decisive role in transition. In transplacement, a democratic transition takes place as a result of combined actions of those in power in the authoritarian regime and the oppositions. The agreement between the authoritarian government and the opposition is critical to democratization, so transplacement could be called as democratization by negotiation. Contrary to the transformation, replacement occurs when there is not any cooperation from the authoritarian regime. The opposition gains power in the course of democratization and the old authoritarian government loses strength or even collapses. Finally, intervention implies a democratic transition that occurs owing to a foreign country.

The third democratic wave countries are classified and positioned by the freedom rating, types of authoritarian regime and types of transition process (See Table 3). In one-party systems, twelve countries out of sixteen (75%) changed to become 'Free'. And among the seven personal dictatorships, five countries (71.4%) became 'Free'. But among military regimes, only 8 countries out of 16 (50%) succeeded in make a transition to 'Free'. Once one-party system and personal dictatorships countries entered the democratization process, the democratic consolidation processes seem relatively easy than military regimes. In cases of one-party system and personal dictatorship, democratization means to lose the power bases. So the empowered oppositional section could institutionalize a new power structure without serious structural resistance.

A democratic consolidation of an ex-military regime appears more difficult. Even if a military regime gives up the control of government, they would not abandon their professional ability to control the violence. Thus, if the military judges that a situation is urgent or if they could lose their benefits, they would come back to power.⁶

6. Third world study extends its scope how to build the civil-military relationships appropriate to the democratic regime (Diamond and Platter 1966; Fitch 1998).

Table 3 Types of Authoritarian Regime, Democratization Processes and Freedom Rating Authoritarian regimes

	One-party Systems (16 countries)	Personal Dictatorships (7 countries)	Military Regime (16 countries)
Free	<u>Transformation</u> (4) Bulgaria Hungary, Mexico, Taiwan	<u>Transformation</u> (3) Chile, India, Spain	<u>Transformation</u> (2) Brazil, Peru
(Freedom rating of 1~2.5 in 2005)	<u>Transplacement</u> (4) Czech Rep., Mongolia, Poland, South Africa	<u>Replacement</u> (2) Portugal, Romania	<u>Transplacement</u> (3) El Salvador, South Korea, Uruguay
(25 countries)	<u>Replacement</u> (3) Estonia, Latvia Lithuania		<u>Replacement</u> (2) Argentina, Greece
	<u>Intervention</u> (1) Grenada		<u>Intervention</u> (1) Panama
	(12 countries)	(5 countries)	(8 countries)
Non-Free	<u>Transformation</u> (3) Belarus, Russia, Ukraine	<u>Transplacement</u> (1) Nepal	<u>Transformation</u> (6) Ecuador, Guatemala, Nigeria, Pakistan Sudan, Turkey
(Freedom rating of 3~7 in 2005)	<u>Transplacement</u> (1) Nicaragua	<u>Replacement</u> (1) Philippines	<u>Transplacement</u> (2) Bolivia, Honduras
(14 countries)	(4 countries)	(2 countries)	(8 countries)

1) Classification of authoritarian regimes is based on Huntington (1991/2).

2) Non-Free includes partly free countries and not free countries in 2005.

3) Huntington classified South Africa as a racial oligarchy, but I included it in the one-party system.

4) Huntington devided democratization processes as four categories which are transformation, transplacement, replacement and democratization from intervention.

Table 3 also shows that the type of transition processes is important in democracy consolidation. Seven countries that accomplished ‘democratization from the bottom (replacement)’ have advanced to become free countries. Two countries democratized by external intervention were transformed into free countries. Grenada and Panama all experienced the U.S. intervention in democratization. This led to the introduction of American-style democracy. Among the eleven ‘democratization by compromise (transplacement)’ countries, seven countries (63.6%) changed to ‘Free’ countries. But among the eighteen countries of ‘democratization from the top (transformation)’, only nine countries (50%) advanced to ‘Free’ countries. This illustrates the significance of people’s opposition or participation against the authoritarian system.

Another hypothesis for democratic consolidation is about the relationship between economic and democratic developments. There have been many debates on this topic. The most common relationships are linear, curvilinear, and a ‘step’ function (Landman 2000:63-4). Table 4 shows the freedom ratings according to income in 2001. Among the countries whose incomes are over \$15,000, 82.8% are categorized as ‘Free’ country. On the contrary, under \$1,000 and \$1,000-2,500 countries, just 9.2% and 7.7% respectively, are ‘Free countries’. And 66.7% of the countries with incomes that ranged from \$5,000-\$9999 and 30.6% of the countries with \$2,500-\$5,000 are included in ‘Free countries’.

As a whole, an income level of \$5,000 can be the standard to share a different relationship between economic development and democracy. While the interrelation clearly distinguishes high income and low income countries, middle income countries are not clear. For example, countries with income level of \$2,500-\$5,000 are dispersed almost equally into free, partly free and not free. Thus, it is difficult to assume all middle income level countries are free.

What about the countries hit by the third wave of democratization? GDP per

Table 4 Economic Performances and Democracy (2001) [Unit: Country, (%)]

	Free	Partly Free	Not Free	Total
>\$15,000	24 (82.8)	2 (6.9)	3 (10.3)	29 (100)
\$5,000-\$15,000	32 (66.7)	9 (18.8)	7 (14.6)	48 (100)
\$2,500-\$5,000	11 (30.6)	14 (38.9)	11 (30.6)	36 (100)
\$1,000-\$2,500	6 (7.7)	16 (41.0)	17 (43.6)	39 (100)
<\$1,000	2 (9.5)	12 (57.1)	7 (33.3)	21 (100)

Source: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/gdp.html>.

capita in 2004 and GDP growth rate from 1990 to 2004 are taken into consideration. One would expect that if GDO per capita or GDP growth rate is high, people support democratization. And democratic consolidation takes place easily. Among the thirty-nine countries that rode the third wave of democratization, high income countries (more than \$10,000) are all free. Meanwhile, 8 out of 13 countries with middle income (\$5,000-9999) are Free. And only two out of twelve countries with low income (under \$5,000) are Free (See Table 5).

GDP growth rate also is related to democratic consolidation (See Table 6).

Table 5 Democratization and GDP per capita (2004)¹⁾

	Over \$10,000	\$5,000-9999	Under \$5,000
(Freedom Rating 1~2.5)	Argentina (13,298)	Brazil (8,195)	Mongolia (2,056)
	Chile (10,874)	Bulgaria (8,078)	India (3,139)
	Czech Republic (19,408)	El Salvador (5,041)	
	Estonia (14,555)	Grenada (8,021)	
	Greece (22,205)	Mexico (9,803)	
	Hungary (16,814)	Panama (7,278)	
	Lithuania (13,107)	Romania (8,480)	
	Latvia (11,653)	Uruguay (9,421)	
	Poland (12,974)		
	Portugal (19,629)		
	South Africa (11,192)		
	South Korea (20,499)		
	Spain (23,360)		
	Taiwan (n.a.)		
	(14)	(8)	(2)
Non-Free (Freedom Rating 3~7)		Belarus (6,790)	Bolivia (2,720)
		Peru (5,678)	Ecuador (3,963)
		Russia (9,902)	Guatemala (4,313)
		Turkey (7,753)	Honduras (2,876)
		Ukraine (6,394)	Nepal (1,490)
			Nigeria (1,154)
			Nicaragua (3,634)
			Pakistan (2,225)
			Philippine (4,614)
			Sudan (1,949)
	(0)	(5)	(10)

1) The sources of GDP per capita (2004) are from UNDP (2006: 331-4).

Table 6 Democratization and Annual Growth Rate (1990-2004)¹⁾

	Over 2.5%	1-2.5%	Under 1%
Free (Freedom Rating 1~2.5)	Chile (3.7)	Argentina (1.3)	Bulgaria (0.7)
	Czech Rep. (2.7)	Brazil (1.2)	South Africa (0.6)
	Estonia (4.3)	El Salvador (1.8)	Uruguay (0.8)
	Greece (2.6)	Lithuania (1.4)	
	Grenada (3.1)	Mexico (1.3)	
	Hungary (3.1)	Mongolia (2.4)	
	India (4.0)	Panama (2.2)	
	Latvia (2.8)	Portugal (2.1)	
	Poland (4.0)	Romania (1.4)	
	South Korea (4.5)	Spain (2.3)	
	Taiwan (n.a.)		
	(11)	(10)	(3)
Non-Free (Freedom Rating 3~7)	Sudan (3.4)	Belarus (1.6)	Ecuador (0.2)
		Bolivia (1.2)	Honduras (0.2)
		Guatemala (1.3)	Nigeria (0.8)
		Nepal (2.1)	Nicaragua (0.1)
		Pakistan (1.6)	Philippines (0.9)
		Peru (2.1)	Russia (-0.6)
		Turkey (1.6)	Ukraine (-3.2)
	(1)	(7)	(7)

1) Sources of Annual Growth Rate (1990-2004) are from UNDP (2006: 331-4).

For 15 years from 1990 to 2004, twelve countries achieved average annual growth rate over 2.5%. Among them, eleven countries are free countries, which are the absolute majority, 91.7%. However, ten out of seventeen with average annual growth rate of 1-2.5%, 58.8% are free. And under 1% of average annual growth rate, three out of ten, 30% are free.

In sum, both income level and growth rate are related to consolidation of democracy. Carefully examinations of Table 5 and Table 6 show high income (over \$10,000) always consolidates democracy. Even if income level is not high, a country that is able to sustain a high growth rate can become free (India, Mongolia). Conversely, countries with relatively high income but low growth might be non-free (Belarus, Peru, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine). Taking all this into account, for the middle level income countries, high economic growth is more important to consolidate democracy than absolute income level.

Culture and Democratic Consolidation

Most scholars agree that culture has a close relationship with democracy.⁷ Of course, culture is not solely related to democracy. But it is considered as a crucial factor to explain political and economic development. Inglehart (2001:167) insists that “in the long run, whether democracy can survive is solely dependent on value and belief.” Rapid change like democratization includes criticism about not only various institutions but also cultural characteristics of authoritarian system. Reversely, consolidation of democracy requires an internalizing democratic value system as culture. After all, a hypothesis could be made that the perception on democratic system influences consolidation of democracy.

However, to use cultural variables in an empirical analysis is not easy. In many analyses, the unchanging traditional factors are regarded as culture. Here following Huntington (2001:11), culture means predominantly appearing values, attitudes, beliefs and promises in a society. Democratic value indicates the positively internalizes value system of democracy.

1. Data

This paper uses raw data collected in the 4th World Values Surveys. World Values Surveys conducted studies four times in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 1995-1999, and 1999-2004. The 4th World Value Survey includes sixty-two countries. And out of the sixty-two countries, twenty-five countries experienced democratization during the third wave. However, Nigeria is excluded in the analysis because of poor data reliability. Thus, 24 third democratic wave countries are used in the analysis. To compare third democratic wave countries, nine traditional democratic countries are included.⁸ In the end, a total of thirty-three countries are analyzed. The dates of collecting data are different among the countries. In Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,

7. The issues of culture and democracy could back to Max Weber. In the 1940s and 1950s, major social scientists, such as Ruth Benedict, Talcott Parsons, Alex Inkeles, Gabriel Armons, Sydney Verba, and Seymour Martin Lipset, commonly stressed the importance of culture. The academic interest to the culture re-emerged in the 90s (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1996; Huntington 1997). Recently Huntington and Harrison (2001) edited “Culture Matters.”

8. Traditional democratic countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A.

Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the U.S.A. data are collected in 1999. In Belarus, Canada, Japan, Chile, Mexico, and Spain data are collected in 2000. As for the rest six (India, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey) data are collected in 2001.

In addition, subjects of analysis are limited to respondents whose age ranged from 20 to 69. The rationales to exclude other ages are as follows. I excluded age under 19 because, I think, a person needs some social experiences to evaluate democratic system. I set a high limit at the age of 69 because the data reliability of elderly person is expected to be low.

2. Variables

Six questions are used to measure democratic value. These are (1) 'Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections', (2) 'Having army rule', (3) 'Having a democratic political system', (4) 'In democracy, economic system runs badly', (5) 'Democracies aren't good at maintaining order', (6) 'Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government'.

The preference of strong leader seems to be the tendency related to authoritarianism. Based on Finer (1989) the preference of army rule could be interpreted as having authoritarian culture. Positive answers to questions (3) and (6) reflect having preferences to democratic value. The rest two questions are about relations between democracy and economy and democracy and social order. In these questions, the negative answers represent having democratic value. Each question has four scales from 'very good' to 'very bad' or from 'absolutely agree' to 'absolutely disagree'. 'Very bad' in questions (1) and (2) and 'very good' in question (3) are interpreted to have democratic culture. 'Absolutely disagree' in (4) and (5) and 'absolutely agree' in (6) are value system favoring democratic system.

The direction of answer is opposite according to the question. It makes the analyses confusing. Therefore, abbreviations are made as the following: '(1) Anti-Authoritarianism (AA)', '(2) Anti-Militarism (AM)', '(3) Pro-Democratic Party System (PDPS)', '(4) Democracy propels Economic Development (DED)', '(5) Democracy maintains Social Order (DSO)', and '(6) Pro-Democratic Governance (PDG)'. The answers are re-scaled from 1 to 4. Low points illustrate that society has democratic value system or prefers democratic governance.

3. Analysis

Table 7 shows correlations between above mentioned six variables. All six variables correlate each other. The coefficients are from 0.119 (AA and PDG) to 0.511 (DED and DSO). When factor analysis is taken, the six variables could not be summarized in one variable. This illustrates that six questions may not be the indicators of democratic value. But I made a representative variable, DEMO (democratic value). DEMO is achieved by take a simple mean of the above six values.

Table 8 presents Freedom Rating 2000, each score of six variables and DEMO. The third democratic wave countries are divided according to Freedom rating 2000. If a country's Freedom Rating 2000 is under 2.5, it is classified as a democratic consolidating country, and if a country's F/R 2000 is higher than 3.0, it is classified as a democratically retarded country. Among the thirty-three countries, traditional democratic countries are nine, democratic consolidating countries are seventeen, and democratic retarded countries are seven.

If average values of 6 variables are compared with three groups, the order is democratic country < democratically consolidated country < democratically retarded country. This is very revealing and there is no exception.

Table 7 Correlations between Variables

	AA	AM	PDPS	DED	DSO	PDG
Anti-authoritarianism (AA)	1.000					
Anti-militarism (AM)	0.377***	1.000				
Pro-democratic party system (PDPS)	0.223***	0.213***	1.000			
Democracy propels Economic Development (DED)	0.237***	0.237***	0.246***	1.000		
Democracy maintains Social Order (DSO)	0.240***	0.237***	0.251***	0.511***	1.000	
Pro-democratic governance (PDG)	0.199***	0.228***	0.467***	0.185***	0.203***	1.000


2-tailed test *** p<0.001

Table 8 Value to the Democratic Regime

	F/R 2000	AA	AM	PDPS	DED	DSO	PDG	DEMO (mean)
Canada	1.00	1.81	1.29	1.60	2.20	2.21	1.77	1.79
Denmark	1.00	1.57	○1.08	1.25	1.91	1.88	○1.28	○1.46
France	1.50	2.06	1.21	1.63	2.48	2.57	1.45	1.88
Germany	1.50	○1.52	1.16	1.50	○1.79	○1.80	1.42	1.51
Italy	1.50	1.65	1.31	1.48	2.30	2.07	1.64	1.72
Japan	1.50	1.91	1.14	1.69	2.10	2.07	1.93	1.77
Sweden	1.00	1.73	1.43	1.30	1.88	1.91	1.55	1.60
United Kingdom	1.50	1.84	1.31	1.71	2.01	2.11	1.95	1.80
U.S.A.	1.00	2.04	1.51	1.63	2.11	2.12	1.74	1.85
Traditional	1.28	1.79	1.27	1.53	2.09	2.08	1.64	1.71
Democratic								
Country(mean)								
Bulgaria	2.00	2.40	1.63	1.69	2.33	2.22	1.73	1.94
Chile	1.50	2.29	1.84	1.79	2.25	2.23	1.78	2.02
Czech Rep.	1.00	1.68	1.21	1.62	2.33	2.57	1.67	1.83
Estonia	1.50	1.85	1.33	2.00	2.30	2.26	1.91	1.91
Greece	1.50	1.35	1.33	1.20	2.43	2.26	1.38	1.65
Hungary	1.50	1.83	1.29	1.81	2.31	2.33	1.96	1.89
India	2.50	2.80	1.85	1.58	2.46	2.40	1.64	2.09
Latvia	1.50	2.61	1.28	1.97	2.48	2.42	1.89	2.08
Lithuania	1.50	2.62	1.48	1.92	2.42	2.52	1.93	2.09
Mexico	2.50	2.55	2.18	1.89	2.54	2.49	1.99	2.28
Peru	2.00	2.35	1.76	1.56	2.60	2.48	1.83	2.09
Philippines	2.50	2.73	•2.47	1.91	2.57	2.54	1.99	2.37
Poland	1.50	1.94	1.77	1.97	2.48	•2.85	1.88	2.11
Portugal	1.00	2.20	1.66	1.68	2.40	2.44	1.66	2.02
Romania	2.00	2.84	1.91	1.76	•2.61	2.49	1.95	2.19
South Africa	1.50	2.05	1.70	1.63	2.39	2.31	1.81	1.96
South Korea	2.00	2.12	1.46	1.97	2.08	2.10	1.91	1.92
Spain	1.00	1.91	1.48	1.53	2.11	1.96	1.64	1.76
Democratic	1.69	2.20	1.65	1.75	2.39	2.38	1.81	2.01
Consolidation								
Country(mean)								
Argentina	3.00	2.22	1.70	1.70	2.46	2.29	1.65	1.97
Belarus	6.00	2.34	1.86	1.78	2.24	2.35	1.82	2.02
Pakistan	5.50	2.28	1.54	1.62	2.36	2.59	1.83	1.99
Russia	5.00	2.48	1.88	•2.37	2.60	2.77	•2.30	•2.37
Turkey	4.50	•2.92	2.02	1.62	2.24	2.29	1.71	2.12
Ukraine	4.00	2.70	1.66	1.98	2.35	2.53	1.97	2.15
Democratic	4.71	2.52	1.88	1.85	2.40	2.48	1.90	2.14
Retarded								
Country (mean)								

1) ○, • indicates that democracy value is highest (○), lowest (•) in each index.

Figure 2 Freedom Rating and Democratic Value



This result means the traditional democratic countries have the most positive perceptions of democratic system. And the democratic consolidating countries positively evaluate democratic political system than the democratically retarded countries. This is clear evidence that people’s democratic value facilitates democratic consolidation.

Let’s look at the results more concretely. Russia got the lowest score in two variables (PDPS and PDG). In fact, Russia has shown a regressive phenomenon to democratic consolidation. Russia’s freedom index in 1995 was 3.5. But in 2000, it increased to 5.0. During the five years, Russia’s democracy did not progress. On the contrary, Russia experienced a retreat of democracy. Of course, there exists an exception. Greece, although it is not a traditionally democratic country, it turns out it has the highest value in PDPS. However, considering that the western democratic systems originated from Greek tradition, it is understandable why it has the highest approval rate even though it is one of the countries hit by the third wave of democratization.

Among the countries whose democratic consolidation is in the process, the Philippines show the lowest democratic value in AM. But as Table 2 demonstrates, the freedom rating of the Philippines in 2005 has fallen from 2.5 in 2000.

It is said that democratic consolidation in the Philippines has a relatively weak foundation. Romania is the most negative in democracy and economic development. However, when considering the freedom index after 2000, there was a period of decline from 2.0 to 2.5 in 2004 (See Table 2). One can conclude that the foundation of democracy in Romania is also very weak.

Democratic value of Poland has a weakness concerning the relations between democracy and social order. Nevertheless, the freedom rating of Poland continues to rise to 1.0, absolutely free in 2004. For a better explanation, more detail analyses are needed. But it is noticeable that the AA value of Poland is very high. Although democracy was considered not to be a positive factor in maintaining social order in Poland, due to the positive AA value, Poland could achieve democratic consolidation in a relatively faithful manner.

As mentioned above, DEMO is made up of simple average value of six variables. Figure 2 indicates Freedom Rating 2000 on the Y axis and DEMO as democratic value on the X axis. Each country is charted. Looking at the trend line, as a whole, democratic value is related to Freedom Rating. The trend line explains 28% ($R^2=0.2799$) of variation.⁹ This suggests that stabilization of democratic value can make a favorable environment for democratic consolidation.

If the hypothesis that democratic value is necessary to consolidate democracy is acceptable, the countries above the trend line suggest that they have a high possibility to enhance freedom rating in the future. On the other hand, the countries located far from the trend line, because they have weak democratic value, have difficulties in consolidating democracy. Actually, the countries above the trend line, Greece, Korea and Argentina, have proven that the freedom ratings have improved in 2005. However, countries like Belarus, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine which are positioned far from the trend line experienced a retreat in democracy until 2005 (See Table 2).

Concluding Remarks

This paper investigated how countries change after the third wave of democratization focusing democratic consolidation. The conclusion is that some countries

9. Linear trend line only explains 26% ($R^2=0.2556$) of variation.

have temporarily demonstrated regression toward authoritarianism, but as a whole, democratization is advancing. But the paces of democratic consolidation vary according to the types of pre-democratization authoritarian system and democratization processes. Especially, countries that made a transition from military regime have more difficulties than One-party System and Personal dictatorship. As for the processes of transition, the more people actively participate in democratization the easier the transition to consolidate democracy.

Furthermore, the relations between economic factor and democratic consolidation were examined. It is found that economic development or economic growth positively relates to democratic consolidation. Majority of the high income countries are democratic countries. But as for the middle income countries, high economic growth was more important than income level in influencing democratic consolidation.

Finally, the relation between cultural values and democratic consolidation was analyzed. It is found that a positive assessment to democratic system and democratic governance facilitated democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, comparing various countries using quantitative data, this study failed to analyze the actual process of democratic consolidation. The study must be supplemented by additional case studies of democratic consolidation.

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From a comparative perspective on the third wave of democratization, I deal with the changes, dynamics and characteristics of Korean democratization. As an approach to democratic consolidation, I use the "maximalist conception." I concur that democracy will be stable and consolidated when democratic order is institutionalized in both the political and socioeconomic arenas. Finally, because I agree that democratic consolidation depends on the political leaders' ability to successfully process and manage conflict, I also analyze the political leadership factor in Korean democratization. In the second chapter, I analyze theoretical studies on the third wave of democratization. He defines a "wave of democratization" simply as "a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period." 1 He identifies two previous waves of democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828 to 1926 and a second wave from 1943 to 1964. Significantly, each of these ended with what he calls a "reverse wave" of democratic breakdowns (the first lasting from 1922 to 1942, the second from 1961 to 1975), in which some of the newly established (or reestablished... How have the concepts of democracy and democratization been redefined for a new generation of scholars oriented to action and advice? What developments in the measurement of the two concepts have been stimulated by the quickening pace of democratization? What kinds of strategies and tactics have been prescribed for encouraging democratic reforms in those countries that remain nondemocratic? What are the prospects for the third wave of democratization? Type. 2 Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 20.